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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ADOPTION, STRINGENCY AND IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF U.S. PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
by
Lilia Silverio-Minaya
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Milena Neshkova, Major Professor
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of performance
management systems (PMS) by examining adoption, stringency, and impact of
performance-based funding (PBF) in public institutions of higher education within the
United States. The public sector has been under increasing pressure to be more
accountable to stakeholders—that is, to perform better at lower cost. Yet, tracking the
effectiveness of performance systems has been challenging, given the host of factors that
affect results. Because of the growing use of performance systems, it is important to
understand what factors affect the adoption and stringency of such systems, as well as
their effectiveness.
Currently, 39 American states have adopted PBF models to hold public
institutions of higher education accountable for reaching state-mandated goals. To assess
the stringency of PBF models, the present study develops a novel measure: the
Performance Funding Uncertainty Index (PFUI). This index consists of five components
reflecting the major elements of PBF models adopted across the nation. Analyzing 15
years of panel data from research institutions of higher education in 39 states the study
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finds that adoption and stringency of the performance systems are not determined by the
same factors. While PBF adoption is more likely in politically conservative states with
underperforming education systems, it does not spread in a geographical pattern as
diffusion theory predicts. Republican-led state legislatures tend to implement more
stringent PBF models. Yet, PBF systems do not gradually become more stringent over
time. Rather, the systems reach a saturation point and eventually stagnate. Using a
difference-in-differences analysis, the study also finds that the PBF adoption and
operation failed to deliver on its main goal—that is, to increase graduation rates of public
universities.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

CHAPTER 1 The Need for a Performance Management System: The Case of Higher
Education ............................................................................................................................ 1
Introduction to the Problem ............................................................................................ 1
Performance Management Systems in the Public Sector ............................................... 4
Performance Management Systems in Higher Education .............................................. 5
Scope of the Dissertation ................................................................................................ 8
Adoption and Stringency of PMS ................................................................................... 9
Impact of PMS .............................................................................................................. 10
Significance of the Study .............................................................................................. 12
CHAPTER 2 A Systematic Review of the Literature on Performance Management
Systems: 20 Years of Research ........................................................................................ 14
Methodological Approach ............................................................................................ 16
Literature Search ....................................................................................................... 16
Eligibility Criteria ..................................................................................................... 18
Study Selection ......................................................................................................... 19
Results of Systematic Review....................................................................................... 21
Journals, Time, and Countries .................................................................................. 21
Research Methods ..................................................................................................... 23
Public Sector Fields .................................................................................................. 24
Analysis of Research Questions.................................................................................... 24
Definitions of a Performance Management System ................................................. 24
Types of Performance Management Systems ........................................................... 26
Goals of Performance Management Systems ........................................................... 27
Themes in Performance Management Systems Research ........................................ 29
Theme 1: Adoption ............................................................................................... 29
Theme 2: Use of Performance Information .......................................................... 29
Theme 3: Impact of Performance Management Systems ..................................... 30
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 57
Future Research Agenda ............................................................................................... 58
Discussion and Conclusion ........................................................................................... 59
CHAPTER 3 A Theory of the Adoption and Stringency of Performance Systems: The
Case of Performance-Based Funding in Higher Education .............................................. 62
Adoption of Performance Systems ............................................................................... 62
System Stringency of Performance Systems ................................................................ 67
Data and Methods ......................................................................................................... 71
Research Setting........................................................................................................ 71
Measuring Adoption and Stringency ........................................................................ 73
Independent Variables .............................................................................................. 85
Results ........................................................................................................................... 88

viii

Adoption of PBF ........................................................................................................... 88
Stringency of PBF ......................................................................................................... 90
Regression Diagnostics ................................................................................................. 94
Findings and Discussion ............................................................................................... 96
Limitations and Future Research .................................................................................. 99
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 100
CHAPTER 4 The Impact of Performance-based Funding in Higher Education ............ 102
Research Design.......................................................................................................... 108
Estimation Strategy ..................................................................................................... 108
Data and Measures ...................................................................................................... 114
Results ......................................................................................................................... 117
Limitations and Future Research ................................................................................ 121
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 123
CHAPTER 5 Discussion, Implications, and Conclusions .............................................. 125
Key Findings ............................................................................................................... 126
Measurement and Goal Setting ................................................................................... 128
Time ............................................................................................................................ 129
Are we willing to engage in the trade-off between PMS and values? ........................ 130
Implications for Public Policy Making and Management .......................................... 131
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 134
Future Research .......................................................................................................... 135
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 138
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 153
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 159

ix

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

Table 1. Systematic Literature Review Search Summary ................................................ 17
Table 2. Performance Management System Track Record .............................................. 31
Table 3. Adoption Studies................................................................................................. 32
Table 4. Use of Performance Information Studies............................................................ 35
Table 5. Impact Studies..................................................................................................... 42
Table 6. Factors that led to the Impact Type .................................................................... 53
Table 7. PFUI: Performance-based funding Dimensions ................................................. 74
Table 8. Principal Component Analysis ........................................................................... 83
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics, Adoption and Stringency Models ................................... 87
Table 10. Logit Results, Adoption Model ........................................................................ 88
Table 11. Regression Results, Stringency Model ............................................................. 91
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics, Impact Model .............................................................. 119
Table 13. Regression Results, Impact Model ................................................................. 120

x

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1. Performance Management Systems' Cycle and Overlaps ................................. 11
Figure 2. PRISMA Flow Diagram .................................................................................... 20
Figure 3. Performance Management Systems Research 2000-2019 ................................ 22
Figure 4. Performance Management Systems Goals ........................................................ 28
Figure 5. States with PBF as of 2015 by Year of Adoption ............................................. 73
Figure 6. Predictive Margins: Anticipated trajectory of Stringency Level vs. Time ........ 93
Figure 7. Parallel Trends Minority Enrollment............................................................... 113
Figure 8. Parallel Trends Graduation Rate within 150% ................................................ 113
Figure 9. Parallel Trends Hispanic And African American Graduation Rate ................ 114

xi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARRA

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act

BLS

Bureau of Labor Statistics

CSPIA

Child Support Performance and Incentive Act

DID

Differences in differences analysis

GPRA

Government Performance and Results Act

IPEDS

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems

JTPA

Job Training Partnership Act

KPI

Key Performance Indicator

NCSL

National Conference of State Legislatures

NPM

New Public Management

NASBO

National Association of State Budget Officers

OLS

Ordinary Least Squares

PART

Program Assessment Rating Tool

PBF

Performance based funding

PFUI

Performance Funding Uncertainty Index

PMS

Performance Management Systems

PRISMA

Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and MetaAnalyses

SHEF

State of Higher Education Finance

xii

CHAPTER 1
The Need for a Performance Management System: The Case of Higher Education
Introduction to the Problem
Soon after I began my PhD program, I became interested in performance fundingbased models. My interest stems from working at a public institution of higher education:
Florida International University. After completing my Bachelor’s degree in 2005, I
worked as an accountant at my alma mater, which allowed me to witness, first-hand, how
quickly the university’s business activities changed as directed by our Provost, to stay
laser on meeting the success metrics and goals that were established by the Florida Board
of Governors. The better we performed, they said, the more funding the university would
be entitled to receive.
What I witnessed was not unique to the State University System of Florida. In
fact, many jobs within higher education were evolving at the beginning of the 2000’s
because of the need to adjust to a new funding environment. The new environment came
as a result of increased scrutiny of institutions of higher education. Under the new
environment, administrators were constantly reassessing priorities in order to remain
aligned with the priorities of lawmakers. As I became immersed in the field of public
administration through my core doctoral coursework, I soon realized that the increasing
focus on PBF in public higher education was a phenomenon that also impacted the
overall public sector.
Public American institutions of higher education are experiencing fundamental
changes to their funding mechanisms. The initial design of these mechanisms did not
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produce significant results in terms of increasing educational attainment. These structures
were initially known for highlighting inputs—that is, the number of enrolled students.
The initial funding mechanisms were enrollment-based funding models. The more
students the institutions enrolled, the more funding they received. The problem with this
formula is that while students were admitted, controls were not installed to ensure that
universities fulfilled their obligations to graduate and retain students. Under this model,
public higher education institutions did not have a system of checks and balances. They
received funds based on the number of students they enrolled, but they were not held
accountable for ensuring that those students completed their degree programs and
graduated.
In my view, new funding models appeared in response to this dilemma. I was
motivated to complete a dissertation on this topic so that I could support the model with
literature, data, and analytics techniques. In this dissertation, I sought to investigate the
factors that affect the adoption of a performance funding system and the configuration of
such as system. In addition, I sought to explore its impact. That is, are these funding
models able to positively impact students as the outputs and outcomes intended?
Several factors provoked the adoption of performance funding in higher
education. The state’s political climate is a factor at the top of the list. In the case of
higher education, the political climate became increasingly hostile toward public
universities and colleges (Rabovsky & Rutherford, 2016). The hostility was not without
reason—universities were not delivering results, particularly in reference to their inability
to produce employable graduates. In addition, in the late 1990s, there was an increased
demand to hold the schools accountable, coupled with calls for new funding models
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(Crow & Shangraw, 2016; Rabovsky, 2014a). This was not an environment unique to
public higher education, it was the common sentiment toward state services in general.
This movement is in line with New Public Management (NPM) reforms. NPM is a school
of thought that replaces traditional rules based-system with market-based, competitiondriven approaches where the citizens are considered customers of public services (Kettl,
2005).
Well-known organizations played an important role in the adoption of
performance-based funding models in higher education. These included organizations
such as the National College Completion Agenda, the Public Accountability Movement,
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and the Lumina Foundation, and Complete College
(Li & Kennedy, 2018). These factors resulted in a fiscal shift from an input-based model
to an output-based model. The new funding models were initiated as a way to enhance
accountability and transparency in higher education (Frølich, 2011). These funding
models emphasize institutions’ outputs and outcomes related to student performance. The
rationale for the new funding mechanisms is that public universities qualify for state
funding based on their success in student retention, graduation, and subsequent
employment. These new funding mechanisms are commonly known as performancebased funding (PBF).
For many reasons, higher education provides a great setting to examine this wave
of changes. There are approximately 710 public four-year colleges or universities in the
United States serving almost nine million students (U.S. Department of Education, 2018).
Higher education budgets are roughly the third largest category in state budgets, preceded
only by Medicaid and K-12 education, costing U.S. states a total of $78 billion (Pew
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Research Center, 2019). Due to the increased emphasis on results that comes with PBF,
institutions of higher education have been forced to adapt quickly. This dissertation
significantly contributes to the literature on performance management systems by
providing further evidence of the impacts generated by this policy instrument, which
continues to be used throughout the United States.
Performance Management Systems in the Public Sector
The wide use of performance management systems (PMS) has a fundamental
premise: organizational performance can be boosted by establishing performance goals,
which can be achieved through effective management practice (Moynihan, 2006;
Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Poister, 2003). Performance systems not only influence the
behavior of public organizations by increasing their accountability (Meier & O’Toole,
2006; Thomas, 2011; Rabovsky, 2014a), but also allow agencies to reassess the
principles that drive their missions (Moynihan, 2005). Initial reforms in the American
government were a result of efforts from the progressive movement to foster systematic
scrutiny of government activities and operations (Melkers & Willoughby, 2001). Reforms
promised to raise awareness of performance among public managers (Moynihan &
Lavertu, 2012), who would have otherwise not have focused on this aspect.
Since 2010, performance management systems have been on the rise in most
areas within the public sector. These systems were adopted for various reasons,
including: to make informed choices and to better direct scarce resources (Bischoff &
Blaeschke, 2016; Sohn & Bae, 2018; Vogel & Hatke, 2018), to keep organizations
accountable for efficient and effective performance (Favero & Rutherford, 2019), and to
enhance the quality of public services (Patrick & Rollins, 2015; Walker, Damanpour &
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Devece, 2011). Broadly, internal and external factors explain the adoption of
performance systems. Political ideology and performance deficiencies are among the
most common internal factors, with Republicans being more likely to institute policies
that are indirectly skeptical of public bureaucracy than Democrats (McLendon, Hearn, &
Deaton, 2006). Other internal factors include generating cost savings, improving
communications and program effectiveness, changing appropriation levels, decreasing
duplicate services, and responding to citizen demands (Melkers & Willoughby, 2001;
Folz, Abdelrazek, & Chung, 2009). Externally, the adoption of a performance system
might be a perceived as a spillover resulting from adoption in another state.
Performance Management Systems in Higher Education
Performance-based funding (PBF) models are a type of performance management
system (PMS). PBF emerged from the New Public Management (NPM) movement,
which advocated the use of performance measures to allocate resources, to empower
public employees to engage in continuous improvement of public programs, and to draw
from the lessons on advantages of markets to produce greater efficiency in the public
sector (Pollitt, 2000). NPM emphasizes efficiency, economies of scale, rationalization,
development of greater market responsiveness, and increased private contributions in the
case of public universities (Guthrie & Neumann, 2007). Some of the practices associated
with NPM implementation are auditing, constant reporting, performance funding, among
others (Kettl, 2005).
Prior to PBF, there were different funding types, such as ones in which
institutions received additional funds only, while in other cases the funding is reduced, or
a combination of both. Although the idea of PBF in higher education is not new, only a
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few states utilized it prior to 2009. However, the number of states considering PBF
models has been on the rise; since 2011, approximately 26 states have adopted—or are
transitioning toward adopting—PBF models in higher education. As of 2015, 32 states
had adopted. Of the 32 states, 65% implemented the model from 2011 to 2016 (National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2016). The underlying premise of the performancebased funding model is compelling: enhanced accountability. In other words, the
overarching goal is to make universities more accountable to society by ensuring that
they fulfill their commitments, particularly those relating to student graduation rates. PBF
mechanisms are designed to directly tie institutional funding to benchmark indicators on
student outcomes (Burke & Henrick, 2003). The new state funding models focus on the
institutions’ outputs to determine the amount of funding an institution is entitled to
receive. For certain institutions, the PBF is sometimes the only source of incremental
funding from the state. Incremental funding are increases to an institution’s base budget
in excess of the prior year’s base budget. In an era where budgets are tight and
incremental funding opportunities are rare, PBF is critical for university administrators.
In the context of higher education, several factors have been identified as
predictors of the PBF adoption. I classify these factors as mission-related, fiscal,
local/state, and national. From a mission angle, there is a need to align university
objectives with the states’ goals and priorities (National Conference of State Legislatures,
2016) due to the overall state and federal government’s lack of confidence in universities’
performance (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008). The fiscal aspect refers to the states’
funding and the way in which universities manage their budgets in an environment where
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resources are scarce. For this reason, the declining state support for higher education is
also an often-cited factor predicting PBF adoption (Birdsall, 2019).
At the state level, socioeconomic factors, state political-party composition, and
legislative professionalism and regional diffusion (Birdsall, 2019) have been found to
play a role in PBF policies. Local factors include ineffective teaching practices and
substandard teachers without accountability (Birdsall, 2018). From a national perspective,
the persistent decline in graduation rates at most community colleges, and the decline in
retention rates from first to second year (McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015), reflect poorly on
United States programs. Notably, President Obama raised concerns about America’s
declining level of educational attainment (Hanes, 2017). Typically, PBF programs are
adopted as a result of multiple factors occurring simultaneously.
The idea behind PBF is to produce quantifiable data that provide meaningful
information about program outcomes (Melkers & Willoughby, 2001). The
implementation of PBF continues to expand. However, the operationalization of PBF
often differs from its original conceptualization. In fact, the initial motivations to adopt
PBF have faded over the years (Compagni & Tediosi, 2012). While PBF was intended to
increase accountability and transparency, it has become—in many cases—window
dressing (Bischoff & Blaeschke, 2016). In other words, the adoption of a PBF system is
often only done for the symbolic benefits associated with its adoption.
Higher education is one of the many areas within the public sector that has
experienced a shift in funding and performance evaluation. A much larger wave of
reforms is currently occurring within different areas of government. The next section
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describes the movement of performance management systems from the broader lens of
the entire public sector.
Scope of the Dissertation
This dissertation examines three interrelated research questions. The first question
explores why some states adopt PBF for their public higher education systems, while
others do not. The second question explores why some states opt for more stringent PBF
models than others. The third research question seeks to investigate whether the
advertised goals of PMS have been realized in the practice of PBF for public higher
education. In summary, the current research will study three aspects of a PMS: adoption,
stringency, and impact.
The dissertation utilizes a three-essay approach, where each essay serves a distinct
purpose. The first essay (Chapter 2) provides a systematic review of prior research on
performance management systems published in the last 20 years—from 2000 to 2019.
The purpose of the literature review is to define the main terms related to performance
management systems, to classify and define types of PMS identified in the literature, and
to document the instances in which PMS have achieved outlined goals. The systematic
literature review yielded a set of 185 paper published between 2000 and 2019. After
removing duplicates and articles that did not meet the eligibility criteria, 59 articles were
fully reviewed. I identified three dimensions that encompassed the definition of a
performance management system. They are: goal setting, measurement, and performance
information. Further, I find that the most prevalent type of performance management
systems entails performance-based funding. Additionally, despite differences in how
goals were articulated, the overall goal associated with the adoption of a performance
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management system is to enhance performance. The literature is mixed with regard to the
effectiveness of PMS. A review of the literature provides support for the study of factors
that affect adoption, as well as for studies that explore the impact of the PMS—topics that
are covered in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
Adoption and Stringency of PMS
The second essay (Chapter 3) examines why some states adopt PFM for their
higher education while others do not, and why some legislatures opt for very stringent
models compared to others. Prior research has produced valuable insights linking the
adoption of performance systems to factors such as performance pressure, ideology, and
isomorphism. However, in Chapter 3, I argue that these are much less helpful in
understanding different configurations of performance systems, or the stringency of the
implemented systems. By and large, adoption is a result of pressure to “do something,”
and it is often used as a symbolic tool to show constituencies and the general public that
an action was taken to address a problem that is salient and/or controversial. However,
such pressure provides little direction on what system should be implemented in practice
and how stringent it will be. In an attempt to address this gap in the literature, I developed
an index that assesses the stringency of PBF: the Performance Funding Uncertainty Index
(PFUI). The index consists of five dimensions reflecting the major features of the PBF
models adopted across the states. The analysis shows that the stringency of performance
systems is a function of learning over time through use. Systems may become more
stringent at first (to address strategic behavior and performance lapses) but will
eventually stagnate and rarely reach maximum stringency level. The theoretical
framework to analyze these questions includes New Public Management, policy
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diffusion, and the principal agent. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions and Logit
models were estimated using data from performance-based funding systems in higher
education.
Impact of PMS
The third essay (Chapter 4) seeks to assess the impact of PBF models. The
research literature on PMS effectiveness has produced mixed results (Gerrish, 2016;
Kroll, 2017; Moynihan & Pandey, 2006). Some scholars argue it works (Gerrish &
Spreen, 2017; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Ho, 2011; Hong, 2018; Poister, Pasha, &
Edwards, 2013), while others argue that it does not (Adriano, 2014; Andersen, 2008;
Angiola & Bianchi, 2015; Gerrish, 2016; Vogel & Hattke, 2018). There is too little
research on actual impact of policies such as PBF. At best, the research on the
effectiveness of performance management systems is inconclusive. Many studies report
no results (Heinrich, 2002; Li & Kennedy, 2018; Yang & Kassekert, 2010); others find
either positive or negative effects (Pasha, 2018; Walker, Damanpour, & Devece, 2011;
Wang & Yeung, 2019).
This dissertation contributes to the body of research on the effects of
performance-based policies by drawing on the example of public higher education and
testing what effects, if any, the PBF funding models have produced. The hypotheses
presented in Chapter 4 explore all three possibilities: no effect, positive effect, and
negative effect. The analysis uses OLS regressions and the difference-in-differences
technique.
The concluding Chapter 5 cross-analyzes all chapters by discussing all three
studies with the objective of synthesizing the findings, providing recurring themes, and
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tracing an agenda for future research while acknowledging the study’s limitations. Figure
1 below represents the overlap among key aspects of PMS addressed by different
chapters of this dissertation. The findings of this study reveal that adoption, stringency,
and impact are interrelated and share many commonalities—though each is unique in
certain aspects. Among the relevant contributions from this dissertation are the issues
found related to time, goal setting, incentives, and measurement.
Figure 1. Performance Management Systems' Cycle and Overlaps

The dissertation utilized quantitative data to test the hypotheses. The empirical
analysis was based on a panel data set which includes data from 2000 to 2015. Using
panel data has several advantages over other data analytics tools, such as cross-sectional
data. Hsiao (2007) outlined some of these advantages. Specifically, panel data usually
allow for more degrees of freedom and more sample variability; panel data has greater
capacity to capture the complexities associated with behavioral hypotheses; lastly, panel
data allow for controlling the impact of omitted variables.
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The data were derived from various sources, including the Integrated PostSecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL), U.S. Census Bureau Data, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, among
others. The sample population consists of 4-year public, doctoral-degree granting
institutions, with a designation of Carnegie Very High Research Universities, R1. I chose
this group of universities as a way to control for the mission aspect. The mission of an
institution of higher education is its reason for being, it defines its purpose and it
represents the field of the organization (Ozdem, 2011). In the case of R1 universities, the
assumption was that all institutions under this classification share significant
commonalities (e.g., research expenditures, PhD degrees awarded). R1 institutions are
striving institutions. O’Meara (2007) conceptualized striving as the “pursuit of prestige
within the academic hierarchy” (p. 122). The total sample resulted in 82 universities. The
university was the unit of analysis for the impact study; whereas the state was the unit of
analysis for my examination of determinants of PBF adoption and stringency.
Significance of the Study
This dissertation contributes to the body of literature in multiple ways. First, it
challenges current knowledge on PBF, which equates the factors explaining adoption and
stringency of performance systems. I argue that these are two separate processes that are
only loosely connected. Second, I provide a new theoretical explanation of how adopted
performance systems evolve over time. Third, I develop a new measure to assess the
stringency of performance systems in higher education. To produce the index, the
features of performance-based funding systems in all 39 states were explored over time.
The Performance Funding Uncertainty Index (PFUI) consists of five dimensions. The
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PFUI contributes to the research literature by allowing comparison of PBF models and
how they are configured. Understanding the factors that affect the adoption and
stringency of performance systems has clear implications for the theory and practice of
public management.
This dissertation contributes to the research literature by providing further
evidence of the impacts generated by PBF—a policy instrument that continues to be used
across the United States. Currently, 39 states and 210 four-year state universities have
employed performance-based funding (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2016).
The trend has been part of the broader performance management movement in public
administration and its effectiveness in practice, as well as the unintended consequences
from its use, which are still too early in the process to be fully understood.
This study is relevant to three identifiable stakeholders:


State legislators and policymakers are concerned about universities’ return on
investment because of the millions of dollars allocated annually to higher
education institutions via state appropriations and federal government and
agencies. This dissertation will help state legislators by providing insight into the
success of accountability mechanisms. Higher education is the third largest
category for states’ spending, reaching $78 billion combined in 2013 (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2019). While higher education is a small portion of the federal
budget, it still represents a significant dollar amount: $3.98 trillion for the fiscal
year 2017 (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2019).
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The study is relevant to university administrators because it will allow them to
learn from the impact of this policy tool. This, in turn, will help them to manage
implementation of performance-based funding models at their own institutions.



Public universities provide opportunities to the overall society, especially for
individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

The study contributes to the research literature on the applications of performance
management systems in the public sector—specifically in public institutions of higher
education.
CHAPTER 2
A Systematic Review of the Literature on Performance Management Systems:
20 Years of Research
This chapter offers a systematic review of the literature on performance
management systems (PMS) published between 2000 and 2019. The research sought to
accomplish several objectives. The first objective was to identify research themes in the
PMS literature. My second objective was to provide a definition of PMS, common types
of PMS and their goals, and a review of the literature on the factors that led to adoption
of PMS. Lastly, a review of the literature covering the effectiveness of PMS is included.
The third objective was to set an agenda for future research. The insights stemming from
this review will aid with the identification of potential gaps in the literature and will,
therefore, provide direction in the establishment of a robust research agenda.
This analysis was guided by the following research questions:
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1. What definitions of performance management systems are identified in the
literature?
2. What specific types of performance management systems are identified in the
literature?
3. What goals have been attributed to a performance management system?
4. What are the impacts of various performance management systems as identified
by the literature?
5. What limitations are found by the studies analyzed?
6. What avenues of future research are proposed in the literature?
In developing the systematic literature review, I adhered to the widely used Preferred
Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). The systematic
literature review yielded a set of 185 papers published between 2000 and 2019. After
removing duplicates and articles that did not meet eligibility criteria, 59 articles were
fully reviewed. I identified three key dimensions of a performance management system:
setting, measurement, and performance information. Further, I found that the most
prevalent type of performance management system is performance-based funding.
Additionally, despite differences in how goals were articulated, the overall goal
associated with the adoption of a performance management system was to enhance
performance. Regarding the effectiveness of PMS, the literature was mixed. This review
of the literature provides directions for future research, as well as limitations of current
studies.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, an overview of the methodological approach is
presented. Then, the results of the systematic review are provided. This is followed by an
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analysis of the research questions. Finally, the conclusions and future research
implications are provided.
Methodological Approach
Literature Search
Cooper (2010) identified four strategies to conduct a systematic literature review.
The objective of this review was to provide a thorough analysis of the current state of the
literature and an overview of the evolution of studies in this area. For this reason, I
selected the period from 2000 to 2019, a 20-year period. An illustration of the number of
articles resulting from each keyword search is included in Table 1. Two of Cooper’s four
strategies were used in this review. First, I conducted a search using Google Scholar. The
keywords used were “performance management system,” “performance management
system adoption,” “performance management system effects,” “performance
management system outcomes” in “public administration.” This search, which generated
152 results, was performed on August 31st, 2019. Another term often utilized and
perceived as a synonym of performance management is “management for results.” For
this reason, an additional search was performed using the keywords “management for
results,” “management for results adoption,” “management for results impact,”
“management for results effects,” and “management for results outcomes” in “public
administration.” The selection of these terms was done in consultation with members of
the search and screen committee and my major professor. This search generated 20
results and was conducted on September 1st, 2019.
Finally, a search was done using the keywords “performance-based funding,”
“performance-based funding adoption,” “performance-based funding impact,”
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“performance-based funding effects,” and “performance-based funding outcomes” in
“public administration.” This search generated 76 results and was done on September 1st,
2019. The term public administration was used to exclude literature results related to the
private sector.
Table 1. Systematic Literature Review Search Summary
Keyword
American Review of Public
Administration
Google Scholar
JSTOR
Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management
Journal of Public
Administration, Research
and Theory
Public Administration
Public Administration
Review
Public Management Review
TOTAL

Performance
Management
System

Management
for Results

Performance
Based Funding

TOTAL

0

1

1

2

152
463

20
5

76
870

248
1338

16

8

3

27

18

24

2

44

20

20

7

47

35

29

8

72

19
723

18
125

6
973

43
1821

As a second strategy, I searched for journal articles on performance management
in journals in Public Administration using JSTOR. These journals included Public
Administration Review, Public Administration Quarterly, Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management, Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory, and Public
Performance and Management Review. The same key words that I used in Google
Scholar were used here, and a total of 1,338 journals were identified. The searches were
performed on August 31, 2019. JSTOR journal publication dates were not up-to date:
Public Administration Review was only available through 2013; Public Administration
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Quarterly through 2016; Journal of Policy Analysis and Management through 2013;
Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory through 2013; and, Public
Performance and Management Review through 2011. To account for publications not
included in JSTOR, an additional search was conducted using the Florida International
University Green Library search engine in these journals. The search in Public
Administration Review generated 72 results; the Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management generated 27 results; the Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory resulted in 44 articles. Three additional journals were included in this search
because they were not available through the library search engine. They are: Public
Management Review, American Review of Public Administration, and Public
Administration. The search in Public Management Review yielded 43 articles, while the
search in American Review of Public Administration generated 2 results. The search in
Public Administration produced 47 results.
Eligibility Criteria
I adhered to the widely used Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review
and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA). Studies from my original searches were only included in
the systematic review if they met all of the following inclusion criteria:


Field: Studies must be in the field of performance management in the public
sector.



Topic: The following keywords must be included in the title or abstract of the
article: “management for results,” “performance-based funding,” “performance
management system,” “performance management,” “performance funding,”
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“performance-based budgeting,” “performance system,” or “performance
budgeting.”


Study design: Only empirical, quantitative studies were included in this analysis
because I was interested in rendering a comprehensive accounting of how
performance management was understood using quantitative analytical tools.



Publication year: Studies that were published between 2000 and 2019 were
included. This covered a 20-year period, which would allow me to develop a full
understanding of advancements in the literature on performance management, as
well as develop avenues for future research.



Language: Only records written in English were included.



Publication status: Studies must have been conducted by at least one researcher at
the PhD student-level. Studies were only included when they had a reference to
the place of dissemination (journal, academic conference).

Study Selection
In total, I screened approximately 2,000 articles. Based on the eligibility criteria, I
eventually included 59 articles. My selection process is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. PRISMA Flow Diagram

First, I screened the studies by scanning the abstracts and titles. For this purpose, I
checked the articles against the eligibility criteria as previously outlined (topic, language,
year, etc.) to determine if they would be included in the review. For example, a selection
criterion was the inclusion of “performance management” in the title. Articles were not
selected if the title included only “performance.” This allowed me to eliminate many
articles in other disciplines (e.g., Human Resources). The field was another important
selection criterion. Articles were excluded if they were not specific to the field of public
administration. This first step also allowed for the exclusion of articles that were
duplicates.
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In the second step, articles were screened by reading the full text. Here, I
excluded studies primarily because they used qualitative techniques (e.g. Bianchi &
Tomaselli, 2015; Cosenz, 2018) or because they were not relevant to the topic (e.g.,
Eremin, Wolf, & Woodard, 2010; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2012b). This was a timeintensive process as the relevance to the study was not always obvious from the abstract
and required reading the complete article to fully understand its scope.
For each study selected, I developed a data extraction form to summarize the
author, publication year, title, journal, volume and issue, methods used, objective of the
study, definitions used, antecedents of the performance management system, type of
performance management, theoretical framework utilized for the study, goals of the
performance management system, area of government, population and main variables, as
well as the study conclusion, limitations, and avenues for future research. I then
categorized each study based on scope—specifically, whether the study investigated: the
impact of a performance management system, the adoption of PMS, or the use of
performance information. Further, if the studies focused on the impact of a PMS, themes
were created in order to group the material into four categories. The first category
demonstrated that a PMS produced mixed results, the second determined whether it had
positive effects, the third negative effects, and the fourth no effects.
Results of Systematic Review
Journals, Time, and Countries
The 59 articles included in the systematic review were published in 15 different
journals. More than half were published in two: Public Administration Review (17) and
the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (16). The third journal with
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the most publications was the Public Performance Management Review (6). The majority
of journals were specific to the Public Administration field. It is worth noting, however,
that 3 journals were specific to education policy: Community College Review,
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, and Research in Higher Education. One
publication appeared in a more general journal that focuses on social sciences in
particular: American Behavioral Scientist. While most papers were published in peerreviewed journals, some were PhD dissertations (2) or books chapters (2).
The vast majority of papers were published in the last 10 years (72%), during the
period of 2011-2019. From 2000-2010, only 17 papers were published, and only 5 papers
were published during 2000-2005. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 3. Performance Management Systems Research 2000-2019
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While this literature review focuses on publication years between 2000 and 2019,
some of the articles examined performance management systems during periods prior to
the year 2000 (e.g., Heinrich, 2000; Melkers, 2006). The period most frequently studied
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was during the first five years of the decade, from 2000-2005 (29%). There were 10
articles (17%) that examined the period 2006-2010, and 10 articles that examined
performance management systems during the period between 2011 and 2015. Only one
article investigated the period between 2015 and 2019. Lastly, 9 articles covered more
than 10 years in their study (e.g., Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Gerrish, 2017;
Birdsall, 2018).
Many of the included studies were conducted in the context of the United States
(76%). Other studies focused on Italy (7%), Denmark (5%), England (3%), and Korea
(3%). The remaining articles each focused on other countries [e.g., China (1), New
Zealand (1), and Taiwan (1)].
Donald Moynihan was the most frequently cited author in the articles. This
researcher was either solo author or co-author in seven of the articles included in this
review. Ed Gerrish, with three articles, was the next author whose work was most cited as
part of this review. Other authors worth mentioning—because they participated in more
than one of the articles included in this review—were: Birdsall, Gilmour and Lewis,
Heinrich, Hillman, Kroll, Melkers, Lavertu, Pasha, Poister, Rabovsky, Willoughby, and
Yang.
Research Methods
As specified in the selection criteria, all of the included studies used quantitative
techniques. The majority of analytical methods were either difference-in-differences (7),
ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression (13), panel interrupted time series using
regression analysis (3), and PROBIT (4). Some articles used more advanced techniques,
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such as Montecarlo simulation (Favero & Rutherford, 2019), multilevel structure (Holm,
2018; Heinrich, 2002), and structural equation modeling (Yang & Hsieh, 2007).
Public Sector Fields
Due to the increased emphasis on PMS adoption across the public sector, it was
important to identify the industry field within the public sector that was the basis for each
article. The federal government was the study area within government that was most
prevalent (36% of reviewed articles). This was followed by education (31%). I
subdivided studies focusing on education into K-12 (12%) and higher education (19%)
because they significantly differ. Local government (19%) has also been explored. A
small portion of the articles focused on health (5%). Other areas of government studied
included police and transit, among others.
Analysis of Research Questions
Definitions of a Performance Management System
In this section, I aimed to consolidate the definitions of a performance
management system. Moynihan (2008) defined a performance management system as
one that produces performance information via strategic planning and performance
measurement processes. This information was associated with decision venues—where,
ideally, the information impacts a variety of potential decisions. Moynihan’s definition
has been used by several authors included in this review (e.g., Gerrish, 2016; Gerrish,
2017; Pasha, 2018). This was not the only definition, however. To that end, I have
classified the definitions into three dimensions:
1. Goal setting (e.g., Andersen, 2008; Dimitrijevska-Markoski & French, 2013;
Kroll, 2017; Poister et al., 2013): In order for a performance management system
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to exist, clear goals must be established. A certain level of performance must be
targeted as desirable to achieve.
2. Measurement (e.g., Barnow, 2000; Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008; DimitrijevskaMarkoski & French, 2019; Gerrish & Spreen, 2017; Lam & Wang, 2014): The
goals must be measured to track improvement (Kroll, 2017). The measurement of
performance helps focus on the achievement of the goals (Poister, 2003).
3. Performance information (e.g., Angiola & Bianchi, 2015; Birdsall, 2018;
Rabovsky, 2014a; Gerrish, 2017): This is a predominant theme in the literature on
performance management systems. Thirty-four (43%) of the included papers
focused on the use of performance information (e.g., Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008;
Follz et al., 2009; Moynihan, 2006; Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012). The use of
performance information is considered the fundamental objective of a
performance management system (Lavertu & Moynihan, 2012b). The most
obvious definition of performance information use is the analysis of information
acquired through a performance management system (Ammons, 2001; Van
Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010). A much more novel definition, though,
was suggested by Moynihan and Pandey (2010), who defined performance
information as “a form of organizational behavior. Like other forms of
organizational behavior, employees have discretion about whether, and the degree
to which they engage in it, but are influenced by the social context and formal
systems in which they work” (p. 852).
Therefore, a performance management system is a policy innovation tool that requires
the establishment of goals and the subsequent tracking and measurement of progress
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made toward reaching those goals. The information generated through the tracking of the
progress toward goals is called performance information. A performance management
system requires the establishment of goals, and their tracking. The use of tracking
information may determine whether or not the goals have been fulfilled. The present
research revealed that, typically, a PMS is adopted at an institution without regard to its
effectiveness or usefulness.
Types of Performance Management Systems
The way in which different sectors have operationalized the concept of a
performance management system varies significantly. Annual performance reports,
annual steering documents, company contracts, and measurement of workload and output
are examples of the more traditional systems. Other systems are more sophisticated, such
as the federal government Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). Six studies on
PART were included in this dissertation (Moynihan & Kroll, 2017; Moynihan & Lavertu,
2012; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2012a; Moynihan, Lavertu, & Kanensky, 2012; Moynihan,
2006). Other similar programs, which have become emblematic of the American
government, are the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act (CSPIA) (Gerrish,
2017), the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) (Heinrich, 2002), the U.S. No Child Left
Behind Act (e.g. Heinrich, 2009), and the Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA) (e.g., Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012). All of these programs seek to reform the
federal government by standardizing performance information, which will in turn lead to
better decision making (Moynihan, 2006).
Performance management systems have become a primary tool to establish state
appropriations and overall agency budgets. The type of performance system that was
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most often found in the reviewed articles was the performance-based-funding system (as
described by Lu, Willoughby, & Arnett, 2009; Hanes, 2017). In the context of higher
education, Heinrich (2017) defined performance-based funding as a pre-determined
formula to connect institutional funding to performance measures. Lu et al. (2009)
defined it broadly as a “code that stipulates measurement of government performance and
the application of such measurement to the budgeting” (p. 270). Performance-based
funding management systems have been considered to be among the strongest
accountability policies (Burke, 2002) because institutional funding is directly connected
to the attainment of performance indicators.
Goals of Performance Management Systems
As previously explained, goal setting is an important dimension of a performance
management system. The overarching goal of any PMS, notwithstanding any other
factors which may affect policy-decision, is to enhance performance. However, these
goals may be articulated differently—depending on the organization’s field. Figure 4
presents a word-cloud that is based on the goals articulated in the papers in this
systematic review. Managers and management are central to the performance
management system. Some of the most common themes include: improve, performance,
incentives, achieving, improving, decision making, goals, and results.
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Figure 4. Performance Management Systems Goals

I analyzed the goals based on the area of government where the performance
management system was utilized. In the case of the federal government, the goals of the
performance management system seek to monitor lower levels of government to develop
scores for management categories, to allocate budget resources, to determine strengths
and weaknesses of federal programs, and to foster performance information in decision
making (Barnow, 2000; Gilmour & Lewis, 2005; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2012b;
Moynihan, 2006; Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012; Sohn & Bae, 2018). For higher education,
the goals of the PMS are to increase accountability, find better ways to enhance student
success metrics, and to re-shape incentives (Hillman et al., 2015; Hanes, 2017; Rabovsky,
2012; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Li & Kennedy, 2018). Lastly, for performance
management systems in local governments, the goals can be described as a way to
increase accountability, foster the use of performance information, and to enhance
customer satisfaction (Dimitrijevska-Markoski & French, 2019; Folz et al., 2009; Gerrish
& Spreen, 2017; Marvel & Marvel, 2007).
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Themes in Performance Management Systems Research
Studies were coded based on authors’ objective—as outlined in the abstract
and/or introduction of each article. For this, I created three categories. The first group
includes studies that focus on the adoption of a performance management system. The
second set focuses on the use of performance information. The third group focuses on the
impact of the performance. A total of 15 studies were categorized in group 1; 34 articles
analyzed the use of performance information in the second group; 23 articles studied
impact, in group 3. Some studies were coded under more than one category (e.g., Folz et
al., 2009; Lam & Wang, 2014).
Theme 1: Adoption
In 2001, it was reported that the adoption of PMS was progressing slowly
(Melkers & Willoughby, 2001). By 2009, performance management systems were more
widespread than ever (Folz et al., 2009). Governing structures, legislatures, partisan
preferences, management, external actors, and organizations’ current performance were
central forecasters of the adoption of a PMS (Birdsall, 2019; Bourdeaux & Chikoto,
2008; Hvidman & Andersen, 2013; Rabosky, 2014; Yang & Hsieh, 2007). Table 3
presents the complete list of articles that were categorized into this theme.
Theme 2: Use of Performance Information
I discussed the use of performance information above (see Definitions of a
Performance Management System section). See Table 4 for a list of complete studies
under this theme. The literature reveals that the utilization of performance information is
high (Folz et al., 2009; Gill, Kengmama, & Laking, 2012). Some studies also find the
opposite (e.g., Angiola & Bianchi, 2015). The presence of a PMS alone does not yield
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enhanced performance. It is critical that the information generated by the PMS be used
for the PMS to be successful (Gerrish, 2016).
Theme 3: Impact of Performance Management Systems
Twenty-three of the 59 articles included in this review studied the impact of the
performance management system. Table 5 summarizes the findings and provides
information on the articles. These articles examined whether or not the PMS resulted in
enhanced performance. In general, the studies examined the relationship between the use
of public management reforms and performance (Andersen, 2008), the implications of
performance funding (Birdsall, 2018; Favero & Rutherford, 2019), and the overall impact
of a PMS (e.g., Gerrish, 2016; Gerrish, 2017; Gilmour & Lewis, 2005; Hall & Handley,
2011).
Studies were coded based on their conclusions: mixed results, positive results,
unintended consequences, or no effects. Some studies were coded under more than one
category (e.g., Andersen, 2008; Birdsall, 2018). Table 2 illustrates the proportion of
studies that were classified under each coding category. Sixty-two percent of the studies
were coded as having mixed results, unintended consequences, or no effects. There is
ample evidence of studies reporting unintended consequences or warning about the
possibility of the existence of unplanned outcomes. Papers were classified as mixed
results if some variables within the study improved, while other variables within that
study did not change or deteriorated. Mixed results studies represent 23% of the selected
papers. The percentage of studies that did not report positive results was unexpected,
given the significant effort and resources that were directed toward PMS adoption.
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Table 2. Performance Management System Track Record
Impact Studies
Percentage of Total

Mixed
Results

Positive

Unintended

No Effects

23%

38%

19%

19%
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Table 3. Adoption Studies

Author(s)

1. Birdsall

2. Compagni
and Tediosi

Publication
Year

2019

2012

Title

Conclusion

Policy Adoption, Innovation, and
Performance Management: The Case of
Performance Funding Policies in State
Postsecondary Education
Implementing Performance-Based
Funding for Health Research: When
Governance and Procedural Fairness
Matter

3. Follz,
Abdelrazek,
and Chung

2009

The Adoption, Use, and Impacts of
Performance Measures in Medium-Size
Cities: Progress Toward Performance
Management

4. Gilmour
and Lewis

2006

Does Performance Budgeting Work? An
Examination of the Office of
Management and Budget’s PART Scores
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State higher education governing structures,
increases in public tuition, and educational
attainment are important predictors of adoption.
Implementation of performance-based funding
has persisted, but it has been implemented
differently from what had been imagined.
Improving the decisions made by managers,
supporting budget recommendations and
decisions, and responding to citizen demands for
greater accountability are the three reasons most
commonly cited by chief executives for adopting
performance measures in the first place.
Notwithstanding increasing enthusiasm for
performance budgeting, many problems limit its
implementation. The most important of these is
the unfeasibility of devising unbiased means of
translating performance information directly into
budgeting allocations.

Author(s)

Publication
Year

Title

Conclusion

5. Hall and
Handley

2011

Partisan preferences play a role in the adoption of
City Adoption of Federal Performance
Measurement Requirements: Perspectives a performance management system.
from Community Development Block
Grant Program Administrators

6. Hanes

2017

Institutional Characteristics That Lead to
Increased Student Success Points for
Community Colleges In Texas

Two institutional characteristics do significantly
affect the number of student success points
received by community colleges.

The Cognitive Foundation of a CoProduction Approach to Performance
Measurement: How Do Officials and
Citizens Understand Government
Performance in China?
Legislating Results: Examining the Legal
Foundations of PBB Systems in The
States
Performance-Based Funding for
Community Colleges in Texas: Are
Colleges Disadvantaged by Serving The
Most Disadvantaged Students?

Citizens’ opinions are relevant when it comes to
the adoption of a PMS.

7. Lam and
Wang
8. Lu,
Willoughby,
and Arnett
9. McKinney
and
Hagedorn

10. Melkers and
Willoughby

2014

2009

2015

2001

Budgeters' Views of State PerformanceBudgeting Systems: Distinctions Across
Branches

33

States that do not use performance information
are less likely to adopt a PBF law.
Funding allocation associated with PBF matters.

Implementation of performance-based budgeting
systems is happening gradually. Results show
that opposing views of use and achievement
among budget players, particularly across
branches of government, impacts the adoption of
a PBF.

Author(s)

11. Rabovsky

Publication
Year

2012

12. Rabovsky

2014

13. Sohn and
Bae

2018

14. Walker,
Damanpour,
and Devece
15. Yang and
Hsieh

2011

2007

Title

Conclusion

Accountability in Higher Education:
Exploring Impacts on State Budgets and
Institutional Spending Patterns
Support for Performance-Based Funding:
The Role of Political Ideology,
Performance, And Dysfunctional
Information Environments
Do Public Employees “Game”
Performance Budgeting Systems?
Evidence from the Program Assessment
Rating Tool in Korea
Management Innovation and
Organizational Performance: The
Mediating Effect of Performance
Management
Managerial Effectiveness of Government
Performance Measurement: Testing A
Middle Range Model
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In order to understand organizational
performance, it is important to understand
connections between policy design and
administrative processes.
The partisanship of the state legislature,
organizational performance, and the political
ideology of university presidents are relevant
factors leading up to adoption of PBF.
Executing a performance management system
using the carrot and stick approach, care must be
taken, in particular, on the stick approach.
The effect of management innovation on
organizational performance is fully mediated by
performance management.
External political support affects performance
measurement adoption indirectly through
organizational support and technical training.

Table 4. Use of Performance Information Studies

Author(s)

Publication
Year

Title

Conclusion

1. Angiola and
Bianchi

2015

Public Managers' Skills
Development for Effective
Performance Management.
The level of performance utilization was not very high.
Empirical Evidence from Italian
Local Governments.

2. Bischoff
and
Blaeschke

2016

Performance Budgeting:
Incentives and Social Waste
from Window Dressing

2008

Legislative Influences on
Performance Management
Reform

3. Bourdeax
and Chikoto
4. Dimitrijevsk
a-Markoski
and French
5. Follz,
Abdelrazek,
and Chung

2019

2009

PB induces massive social waste from window dressing.

Professional legislatures and the quality of legislative
involvement results in higher utilization.

Determinants of Public
Administrators' Use of
Performance Information:
Evidence from Local
Governments in Florida
The Adoption, Use, and
Impacts of Performance
Measures in Medium-Size
Cities: Progress Toward
Performance Management

Institutionalization of performance measurement has the
strongest statistically significant positive association with
the use of performance information.
This study finds that among mid-sized U.S.
municipalities, the use of performance measures is more
pervasive than ever.

35

Author(s)

6. Gerrish and
Spreen

Publication
Year

Title

2017

Does Benchmarking Encourage
Improvement or Convergence?
Evaluating North Carolina’s
Fiscal Benchmarking Tool

7. Gerrish

2017

8. Gill,
Kengmama,
and Laking

2012

9. Gilmour
and Lewis

2005

10. Gilmour
and Lewis

2006

11. Heinrich

2002

Conclusion

Local governments respond to financial performance
information by giving in to isomorphic pressures.

Performance incentives do result in the improvement of
The Effect of the Child Support
public sector performance. It also suggests that reforming
Performance and Incentive Act
performance systems in response to perceived problems
of 1998 on Rewarded and
may create unintended consequences, such as adverse
Unrewarded Performance Goals
behavior to alter results.
Statistical Analysis of the
The survey respondents make extensive use of numerical
Managing for Organizational
and organizational information for managing
Performance Survey
performance.
Assessing Performance
Budgeting at OMB: The
Performance and results do not play as obvious a role as
Influence of Politics,
might be anticipated.
Performance, and Program Size
Notwithstanding increasing enthusiasm for performance
Does Performance Budgeting
budgeting, many problems limit its implementation. The
Work? An Examination of the
most important of these is the unfeasibility of devising
Office of Management and
unbiased means of translating performance information
Budget’s PART Scores
directly into budgeting allocations.
The use of administrative data in performance
Outcomes-Based Performance
management is improbable in generating precise
Management in the Public
estimations of accurate program impacts. But these data
Sector: Implications for
can still produce valuable information for public managers
Government Accountability and
about policy levers that can be employed to advance
Effectiveness
organizational performance.
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Publication
Year

Title

2009

Third-Party Governance Under
No Child Left Behind:
Accountability and
Performance Management
Challenges

Accurately measuring the performance of individual
providers in increasing student achievement is very
difficult to accomplish in practice.

2011

PBB in American Local
Governments: It’s More than a
Management Tool

PBB can be perceived more positively and generally as an
essential part of a management and budgeting reform with
real program and service appeal.

14. Hong

2018

A Behavioral Model of Public
Organizations: Bounded
Rationality, Performance
Feedback, and Negativity Bias

The results show that providing performance feedback
may have a noteworthy influence on public organizations’
motivation for future performance improvement.

15. Hvidman
and
Andersen

2013

Impact of Performance
Management in Public and
Private Organizations

Management matters differently in public and private
organizations.

Author(s)

12. Heinrich

13. Ho

16. Kroll

2017

17. Lavertu and
Moynihan

2012

Conclusion

Can Performance Management
Foster Social Equity?
Stakeholder Power, Protective
Institutions, And Minority
Representation
Agency Political Ideology and
Reform Implementation:
Performance Management in
the Bush Administration
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Performance information use is more likely to benefit
disadvantaged groups if these groups are large and
influential. It is less probable to hurt underprivileged
interests if formal shielding institutions exist that
decision-makers consider relevant.
Managers who report greater participation in the PART
review process also report greater use of performance
information.

Author(s)

18. Lu,
Willoughby,
and Arnett

Publication
Year

Title

2009

Legislating Results: Examining
the Legal Foundations of PBB
Systems in the States

19. Holm

2018

20. Marvel and
Marvel

2007

21. Melkers

22. Moynihan

23. Moynihan
and Kroll

2006

Conclusion

Successful Problem Solvers?
Managerial Performance
Information Used to Improve
Low Organizational
Performance
Outsourcing Oversight: A
Comparison of Monitoring for
In-House and Contracted
Services
On the Road to Improved
Performance: Changing
Organizational Communication
through Performance
Management

States that make robust use of performance information
for resource allocation decisions tend to establish legal
foundations that stipulate how measurement will be
incorporated into the budget process.
Performance gains require constant perseverance.

Services provided internally by a government's own
employees are indeed monitored intensively by the
contracting government.
Real progress has been made in terms of changing
organizational cultures in state and local governments to
make use of performance measurement.

2006

What Do We Talk about When
We Talk about Performance?
Dialogue Theory and
Performance Budgeting

Performance information is used, but the connotations
allocated to such data are biased and will be construed and
discussed among diverse actors in accordance with their
principles, education, incentives, partisan preferences, and
cognitive features.

2016

Performance Management
Routines that Work? An Early
Assessment of the GPRA
Modernization Act

The Modernization Act is associated with the purposeful
use of performance data to manage programs and
employees and pinpoint and solve problems
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Author(s)

24. Moynihan
and Lavertu

Publication
Year

2012

25. Moynihan
and Pandey

2005

26. Moynihan
and Pandey

2010

27. Moynihan,
Lavertu, and
Kamensky

2012

Title

Conclusion

Does Involvement in
Performance Management
Routines Encourage
Performance Information Use?
Evaluating
GPRA and PART
Testing How Management
Matters in an Era of
Government by Performance
Management
The Big Question for
Performance Management:
Why Do Managers Use
Performance Information?
Does Involvement in
Performance Management
Routines Encourage
Performance Information Use?
Evaluating GPRA and PART
[with Commentary]
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Managerial involvement in GPRA and PART has had a
direct impact on relatively few aspects of performance
information use.
Management matters to performance, and it is reasonable
to expect managers to undertake actions to enhance
performance.
Performance information use is more likely to be driven
by altruism rather than self-interest among government
office.
GPRA and PART have been most effective in
encouraging passive forms of performance information
use.

Author(s)

28. Onesti,
Nunzio, and
Bianchi

29. Rabovsky

30. Rabovsky

Publication
Year

Title

Conclusion

2016

Learning by Using Performance
Measures in Local
Governments: The perspective
of Public Managers

Executives in municipalities with a higher percentage of
enforcement measures are likely to be more mindful of the
significance of measuring and analyzing past performance
in order to reduce further potential financial losses.

2012

Accountability in Higher
Education: Exploring Impacts
on State Budgets and
Institutional Spending Patterns

The link between performance information and funding
may already be more substantial than many observers are
currently aware.

2014

Using Data to Manage for
Performance at Public
Universities

Organizational use of performance data is strongly related
to the political ideology of agency leaders.

31. Rivenbank,
Fasiello,
and Adamo

2019

32. Soss,
Fording,
and Schram

2011

Exploring Performance
Management in Italian Local
Government: The Necessity of
Outcome
The Organization of Discipline:
From
Performance Management to
Perversity and
Punishment
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Local officials are more likely to engage in performance
data use when they embrace outcome measures and when
they increase the level of citizen participation.
Strong performance pressures promote the use of
sanctions to discipline the poor because they are a form of
coercive power.

Author(s)

33. Vogel and
Hattke

34. Wang and
Yeung

Publication
Year

2018

2019

Title

Conclusion

How is the Use of Performance
Information Related to
Performance of
Public Sector Professionals?
Evidence
from the Field of Academic
Research
Testing the Effectiveness of
“Managing for
Results”: Evidence from an
Education Policy
Innovation in New York City
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The publication output of researchers does not
significantly vary with the perceived use of performance
information in their institutions
EZ reform that gave
principals more managerial authority and autonomy in
return for accountability significantly improved some
performance measures of public schools; the effect of
MFR is not constant over time.

Table 5. Impact Studies

Author(s)

1. Andersen

2. Barnow

Publicatio
n Year

2008

2000

Title

The Impact of
Public
Management
Reforms on
Student
Performance in
Danish Schools

Impact Type

Mixed results
Unintended
consequences

Conclusion

Minimal support to the
expectation that
performance management
systems improve
performance measured as
exam scores, but highly
significant effects on
inequity.
Monitor the potential sideeffects of adopting
performance management
systems.

Exploring the
Relationship
Between
Performance
Management and
Weak results
Program Impact: A
Case Study of The
Job Training
Partnership Act
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Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Contradictions and
dilemmas
decentralization/centraliz
ation and
autonomy/control that are
inherent in performance
management reforms.
Ambiguity in terms of
implementation.
Not enough time has
passed to evaluate the
impact.
Sample not large enough.

There is only a weak
correspondence between the
two performance measures.

Measures of performance
and impact may not be
accurate.

Author(s)

3. Birdsall

4. Bischoff
and
Blaeschke

5. Favero and
Rutherford

Publicatio
n Year

2018

2016

2019

Title

Performance
Management in
Public Higher
Education:
Unintended
Consequences and
The Implications
of Organizational
Diversity
Performance
Budgeting:
Incentives and
Social Waste from
Window Dressing

Will the Tide Lift
All Boats?
Examining the
Equity Effects of
Performance
Funding Policies
in U.S. Higher
Education

Impact Type

Mixed results
Unintended
consequences

Conclusion

Effects vary depending on
institutions’ dependence on
state funding.

Organizational
differences (mission,
culture, and resources).

Institutions may fulfil
performance improvements
at the expense of other
significant values.

State dependence on
performance funding
affects responses to
performance funding.

PB induces massive social
waste from window
dressing.

Symbolic
purposes

Mixed results
Unintended
consequences
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Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Performance funding
policies result in
improvement of overall
degree production but have
no statistically significant
association with graduation
or retention rates. The
distributional effects of
performance funding
policies across institutions
should be considered with
regard to winners and
losers.

Imperfect performance
measures.
Proxy information.
Data availability.
Coding.
Institutional
characteristics. More
selective schools benefit
more.
Incentives/rewards
granted to top
performers.

Author(s)

Publicatio
n Year

Title

Impact Type

Conclusion

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Measurement: to find a
way to capture all the
factors that would
increase the institution’s
ability to hit the
benchmarks.

6. Gerrish and
Spreen

7. Gerrish

2017

2016

Does
Benchmarking
Encourage
Improvement or
Convergence?
Evaluating North
Carolina’s Fiscal
Benchmarking To
ol
The Impact of
Performance
Management on
Performance in
Public
Organizations: A
Meta-Analysis

Unintended
consequences

Small but
positive
Gaming
behavior
Time matters

44

Be mindful of the
unintended consequences
associated with
fiscal benchmarking and
performance information.

Lack of guidance about
how to use performance
information.

Performance management
systems tend to have a small
but positive average impact
on performance in public
Use of performance
organizations. Because of
management best
changing organizational
practices.
goals or gaming behavior,
performance management
systems must evolve over
time to keep pace.

Author(s)

8. Gerrish

9. Gilmour
and Lewis

Publicatio
n Year

2017

2005

Title

Impact Type

Conclusion

The Effect of the
Child Support
Mixed results
Performance and
Incentive Act Of
Gaming
1998 on Rewarded
response
and Unrewarded
Performance Goals

The Child Support
Performance Incentive Act
(CSPIA) has had little
impact on Child Support
Enforcement (CSE)
performance; two of the
explicit performance
measures increased
modestly after CSPIA,
while one of the child
support outcomes saw a
substantial decline,
suggesting a gaming
response.

Assessing
Performance
Budgeting At
OMB: The
Influence of
Politics,
Performance, and
Program Size

The ‘‘results’’ component
of PART scores has a
smaller impact on budget
decisions than the
“program purpose”
component, a finding that
tends to contradict the goal
of performance budgeting to
redirect resources to
programs that produce
results.

Small impact
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Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

First, state organizations
may not use performance
information effectively,
or financial rewards
reduce the intrinsic or
public service motivation
of state child support
officials.
Additionally, state
introspection on in-state
cases has apparently
hampered interstate
cooperation, resulting in
a decline in interstate
collections.

Shortage of good
performance measures.
Lack of good measures
for results.

Author(s)

10. Gilmour
and Lewis

11. Heinrich

12. Hillman

Publicatio
n Year

2006

Title

Impact Type

The Bush Administration’s
management scores were
positively correlated with
proposed budgets for
programs housed in
traditionally Democratic
departments but not in other
departments.

Does Performance
Budgeting Work?
An Examination of
The Office of
Mixed
Management and
Budget’s PART
Scores

2009

Third-Party
Governance Under
No Child Left
Behind:
Positive
Accountability and
Performance
Management
Challenges

2018

The Equity
Implications of
Paying for
Performance in
Higher Education

Conclusion

Unintended
consequences
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No Child Left Behind
(NCLB) advanced stronger
accountability for student
performance as the primary
management process
requiring Supplemental
Educational Services (SES)
providers that failed to
increase students' academic
achievement over a 2-year
period.
The findings presented
show that in some of the
nation’s most aggressive
performance funding states,
racial/ethnic minority

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

The impossibility of
devising an automatic or
impartial means of
translating performance
information directly
into budgeting
allocations.
Political preferences may
interfere in budget
allocations.

Clear-cut and widely
accepted measures by
which to evaluate
program effectiveness.

States rarely embed
bonuses for serving
students of color.

Author(s)

Publicatio
n Year

Title

Impact Type

Conclusion

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

serving institutions tend to
lose funding.
Underestimation of
factors that affect the
performance outcomes.

13. Hillman,
Tandberg,
and Fryar

14. Lam and
Wang

2015

2014

Evaluating the
Impacts of “New”
Performance
Funding in Higher
Education

The Cognitive
Foundation of a
Co-Production
Approach to
Performance
Measurement:
How Do Officials
and Citizens
Understand

The performance of
Washington community and
technical colleges was often
not different from
the performance of colleges
in other states that were
never subject to similar
accountability policies.

No effects

Both citizens and officials
agreed that there were
enhancements in the
performance of the
environmental protection
agencies and the education
agencies in the three cities.

Positive
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Lack of internal capacity
at the home institutions.
Steps necessary to
improve outcomes are
complex.
Financial incentives with
performance system were
low.

Citizens assessed
performance by intuition,
not by the actual
performance measures.

Author(s)

Publicatio
n Year

Title

Impact Type

Conclusion

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Government
Performance in
China?

15. Li and
Kennedy

16. Pasha

2018

Performance
Funding Policy
Effects on
Community
No changes
College Outcomes:
Are Short-Term
Certificates on The
Rise?

2018

Can Performance
Management Best
Practices Help
Reduce Crime?

Positive

48

Policies that are more
likely to produce changes
are those that have
distributed funding for
more than 2 fiscal years,
tie a higher proportion of
Performance funding
base state funding
produced no significant
to performance
changes in completions of
outcomes, differentiate
any of the three credentials. performance metrics by
college mission, cover
2- and 4-year sectors,
and/or incorporate
metrics that account for
different populations
served.
Performance dimensions
Performance management is
that are amenable to
significantly related to
control.
improvement in police
performance.
Data manipulation.

Author(s)

17. Patrick and
Rollins

18. Poister,
Pasha, and
Edwards

19. Poister,
Pasha,
DeGroff,
and
Royalty

Publicatio
n Year

2015

2013

2018

Title

Impact Type

Assessing Public
Sector
Performance
Reforms and The
Positive
Plight of
Disadvantaged
Citizens
Does Performance
Management Lead
to Better
Outcomes?
Positive
Evidence from The
U.S. Public Transit
Industry
The Impact of
PerformanceBased Grants
Management on
Performance: The
Centers for
Positive
Disease Control
and Prevention’s
National Breast
and Cervical
Cancer Early
Detection Program

Conclusion

Performance reforms
holding educators
accountable result in
enhancing performance.

States previously had a
performance
management system in
place.

More extensive use of
performance management
practices does in fact
contribute to increased
effectiveness in
the transit industry.

Engaging more
proactively in what have
become conventional
performance
management practices.

These results tentatively
support the argument of
goal-setting theory that
establishing challenging
goals is helpful for
performance improvement.

49

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Political and public
attention.

Author(s)

20. Rabovsky

21. Walker,
Jung, and
Boyne

22. Wang and
Yeung

Publicatio
n Year

Title

2012

Accountability in
Higher Education:
Exploring Impacts
on State Budgets
and Institutional
Spending Patterns

2013

Marching to
Different
Drummers? The
Performance
Effects of
Alignment
between Political
and Managerial
Perceptions of
Performance
Management

2019

Testing the
Effectiveness of
“Managing for
Results”: Evidence Mixed Results
from An Education
Policy Innovation
In New York City

Impact Type

Conclusion

No effect

The results failed to find
any substantial evidence
that performance-funding
policies have had significant
impacts on state budgets’
institutional priorities.

Positive

Performance management is
associated with
better organizational
performance.
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EZ reform that gave
principals more managerial
authority and autonomy in
return for accountability
significantly improved some
performance measures of
public schools; the effect
was not constant over time.

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Financial incentives are
not enough.
Variations in the nature
and content of the
performance
management system.

High degree of role
flexibility and high trust
between politician and
officers.

More managerial
autonomy and authority.
Performance targets give
managers a clear
direction to go and
motivate them to work
toward achieving targets.

Author(s)

Publicatio
n Year

Title

Impact Type

Conclusion

Factors that contributed
to the type of impact

Organizational cheating
or gaming might be a
side effect.

23. Yang and
Kassekert

2010

Linking
Management
Reform with
Employee Job
Satisfaction:
Evidence from
Federal Agencies

Managing for results is
positively related to job
satisfaction.

Positive

51

The same NPM-type of
logic: with more
personnel management
flexibility agencies and
managers can improve
performance and
satisfaction.

Table 6 summarizes the factors that influenced the impact type of the selected
papers. The studies were categorized based on impact type and were coded based on the
factors that led to this impact. The factors were identified following inductive reasoning.
Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) defined an inductive researcher as “someone who works
from the bottom-up, using the participant’s views to build broader themes and generate a
theory interconnecting themes” (p. 23). Inductive reasoning is a qualitative research
attribute because it shifts from very clear-cut observations to much more extensive
generalizations (Soiferman, 2010). In the case of the present study, measurement
emerged as an important factor—several papers cited measurement as a factor, and
several cited it under different impact types. In addition, incentives associated with the
PMS and political support were among the most cited factors in more than one impact
type.
For cases with mixed results impact, the factors affecting impact varied widely.
They were related to the configuration of the PMS (e.g., ambiguity, coding, and
incentives), political and state factors, and organizational factors (e.g., mission, culture,
and management). For cases in which impact was categorized as purely symbolic or
weak, the factors were related to the PMS scope (such as measurement and data). Not
surprisingly, for cases in which impact was categorized as yielding unintended
consequences, the factors were lack of direction and absence of incentives. These were
all external factors and not specific to the organization. In terms of no effect, the factors
were primarily related to the system itself (e.g., incentives, model variations, funding).
Finally, positive results ranged widely—from quality of the measures, which is a PMS
characteristic, to data manipulation and citizen perceptions. It is not a coincidence that
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factors leading to positive results are much broader than for the other impact types. If
researchers and officials had a concrete understanding of the factors that resulted in
positive results, the research literature would be indicative of positive results. As this
research shows, this is not the case. The literature is overwhelmingly lacking evidence of
positive results.
Table 6. Factors that led to the Impact Type
Impact Type

Factors


Contradictions and dilemmas of
decentralization/centralization



Ambiguity



Not enough time has passed to
evaluate impact

Mixed Results



(Anderen, 2008; Birdsall, 2018; Favero
& Rutherford, 2019; Gerrish, 2017;

Organizational differences (mission,
culture and resources)



State dependence on performance

Gilmour & Lewis, 2006; Wang &
funding
Yeung, 2019)



Data availability and measurement



Coding



Incentives, rewards



State introspection



Political preferences
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Impact Type

Factors


Difficulty using performance
information and performance
information bias



More managerial autonomy and
authority is needed



Organizational cheating or gaming

Symbolic and/or Weak



Imperfect performance measures

(Barnow, 2000; Bischoff & Blaeschke,



Proxy information

2016)



Sample not large enough



Lack of guidance about how to use
performance information

Unintended consequences
(Gerrish & Spreen, 2017; Hillman,



No incentives to foster good
performance of underrepresented

2018

populations
Positive



Use of performance management best
practices

(Gerrish, 2016; Gilmour & Lewis,
2005; Heinrich, 2009; Lam & Wang,



Shortage of good measures

2014; Pasha, 2018; Patrick & Rollins,



Good measures

2015; Positer, Pasha, & Edwards, 2013;



Citizen perceptions

Poister, Pasha, DeGroff, & Royalty,



Data manipulation
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Impact Type

Factors

2018; Walker, Jung, & Boyne, 2013;



There was a PBF in place before

Yang & Kassekert, 2010)



Engaging proactively



Political and public attention



Role flexibility



Management flexibility



High trust between politicians and
officers



Underestimation of factors that affect
performance



Lack of capacity

No Effect



Insufficient incentives

(Hillman, Tandberg, & Fryar, 2015; Li



Need more than financial incentives

& Kennedy, 2018; Rabovsky, 2012)



Variations in the models



Longevity



Higher proportion of funding is
necessary

Absence of positive results has commonly occurred in performance management
research (Gerrish, 2016). Notwithstanding the popularity of PMS in the public sector,
PMS often do not meet the expectation that adoption and implementation will foster
performance. A clear cause and effect relationship may not exist between the adoption of
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a performance management system and organizational performance; however, PMS
adoption may still be valuable in that the establishment of goals will provide further
clarity to the organization and its constituents. As a result, performance standards may
have delivered unexpected results, not necessarily because performance was enhanced,
but because of other benefits (Barnow, 2000; Hall & Handley, 2011). For instance, the
effects of using performance information have been: increasing awareness among
organizations, enhancing internal department communication, and better understanding
performance (Melkers, 2006).
Without unified verification that PMS fulfills its promises, we must consider
unintended consequences (Andersen, 2008; Birdsall, 2018; Favero & Rutherford, 2019;
Gerrish, 2017; Gerrish & Spreen, 2017; Hillman, 2018; Moynihan, 2008; Sohn & Bae,
2018). Other motives (e.g., symbolic purposes) have been associated with the adoption of
a PMS (Birdsall, 2019; Bischoff & Blaeschke, 2016; Rabovsky, 2012). The shortage of a
unified perception on the effectiveness of PMS might also be related to the time factor. It
appears that the immediate effect of PMS is to impact the easily achievable targets;
however, it becomes more difficult for the program to produce long term changes due to
the inherent evolution in organizations and the time required for the PMS to adjust
(Gerrish, 2016). The achievement of performance goals requires perseverance and
learning and understanding of the context (Andersen, 2008; Holm, 2018; Melkers, 2006;
Moynihan & Kroll, 2016).
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Limitations
In this section, I summarized the documented limitations found in the studies
included in this review. These are the common themes found in the literature on PMS
included in this review:


Time: reforms required more than six years to produce observable changes,
performance management systems results based on year-to-year reports will not
be able to perceive significant improvements (Andersen, 2008). In addition, even
when multiple years of data are available, tracking data over time is difficult and
requires sophisticated longitudinal analysis (Walker, Damanpour, & Devece,
2011).



Limited population: the scope of certain studies with small samples limits their
ability to be conclusive or generalizable (Angiola & Bianchi, 2015; Barnow,
2000; Birdsall, 2018; Dimitrijevska-Markoski & French, 2019; Rivenbark,
Fasiello, & Adamo, 2019; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011; Vogel & Hattke,
2018).



Measurement: performance management systems may not be able to show strong
correspondence with positive impacts because of inaccurate measures (Barnow,
2000; Birdsall, 2019; Gilmour & Lewis, 2005; Rabovsky, 2014a; Vogel & Hattke,
2018; Wang & Yeung, 2018).



Some studies may not have accounted for all variables (Favero & Rutherford,
2019; Gerrish, 2016; Sohn & Bae, 2018).



Other events may have influenced the performance measures (Hillman et al.,
2015).
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Reverse causality (Kroll, 2017): the adoption of performance management
systems may have been a response to increases or decreases in performance
indicators.

Future Research Agenda
The following common ideas emerged from the articles included in this review.


Considering organizational characteristics and differences: researchers have
shown that factors such as age, size, culture, and trust relations can affect
adoption of a management system; a natural future venue of exploration is how a
PMS can affect performance (e.g., Andersen, 2008; Angiola & Bianchi, 2015;
Birdsall, 2018).



Utilize better measures (e.g., Barnow, 2000; Gilmour & Lewis, 2005; Lavertu &
Moynihan, 2012a; Bischoff & Blaeschke, 2016) and account for measures to
examine how policymakers use performance information (Moynihan, 2006).



Reverse causality—investigate if outcomes of the adoption are related to the
efficacy of PMS (see Birdsall, 2019).



Validate studies by using larger samples and more control variables (e.g.,
Dimitrijevska-Markoski & French, 2019; Favero & Rutherford, 2019; Gilmour &
Lewis, 2005).



Public administration research and practice may benefit from using other
contexts—within and beyond public administration—to understand how PMS are
being designed, implemented, and managed (e.g., Gerrish, 2016; Moynihan &
Pandey, 2010; Patrick & Rollins, 2015; Poister et al., 2018).
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Examine other events that may influence changes in performance (e.g., Li &
Kennedy, 2018).

Discussion and Conclusion
This review of the literature on performance management systems revealed that
the lessons learned rely heavily on the United States context—which crucially informs
our understanding of PMS. Simultaneously, due to the lack of cross-country references,
potential issues with external validity must be considered. Advanced quantitative
techniques, under widely known theoretical frameworks, have been utilized in the
literature. The most common theoretical framework used is New Public Management, as
well as general management literature.
A limitation of this literature review is the lack of multi-disciplinary scope that
stems from limiting the search key words to articles in public administration. This may
have resulted in not capturing research in higher-education, economic journals and other
journals in areas from which important lessons can be learned.
One objective of this chapter was to provide a conceptualization of performance
management systems. I defined PMS as a three-dimensional concept: goal setting,
measurement, and performance information. Each dimension is fundamental to the
lifespan of a PMS. Setting goals would allow for the proper system to be in place,
whereas the measurement of these goals would result in the generation of information
that will be used to track effectiveness of the PMS. Because the establishment of goals is
a vital component of the PMS, I expected the PMS literature to include a theme that
concerns this dimension. This is not the case. Future research in the area of PMS goal
establishment and measurement will be vital to further our understanding of performance
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management systems. Understanding why measurement is cited as a factor in nearly
every impact type is important, and researchers should aim to isolate the factors in
measurement that lead to non-positive results.
The federal government has been subject to many reform efforts that attempt to
create a culture of performance management. The body of research in this review has
studied these programs in depth. Higher education has also been investigated. This sector
characterizes the use of performance-based funding systems. Related to providing a
definition of a performance management system, I also aimed to provide a
comprehensive analysis of goals that are achieved through a PMS. PMS have a common
goal: to enhance performance. I identified the following keywords as goals in the
literature: accountability, effectiveness, incentives, management, results, better, achieve,
improvement, planning, and success.
Three recurring themes in PMS were also identified: adoption, use of performance
information, and impact of the PMS. The research is tilted considerably toward studies in
the use of performance information. Findings on the impact of PMS support the
perception that performance management systems are not as effective as their proponents
claim them to be. The use of performance information has been studied extensively.
More research should focus on the impact of PMS to clarify the effectiveness of these
programs. In addition, more studies should examine factors that lead to adoption.
Understanding factors that lead to adoption is important. After factors are identified, then
factors that yield no results can be eliminated.
In addition, understanding the factors—or combination of factors—that would
lead to enhanced performance is important. Similarly, researchers should investigate why
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measurement could lead to different impacts. Determining effective approaches will
enable policymakers to devise a PMS that will foster performance.
In summary, I encourage researchers in this field to explore three aspects of PMS:
organizational factors and how they affect PMS ability to foster performance, system
configuration (e.g., measurement, data availability, and incentives), and factors (e.g.,
political, geographical, socio-economic) that are external to the organization that
influence the organization’s decision to adopt a PMS.
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CHAPTER 3
A Theory of the Adoption and Stringency of Performance Systems: The Case of
Performance-Based Funding in Higher Education
Prior research has explained the adoption of performance systems as a result of
performance pressure, ideology, and isomorphism. Isomorphism is defined as a force that
makes one entity mirror an entity with similar features (DiMaggio & Powell, 2000).
However, I argue that these processes are less helpful in understanding different
configurations of performance systems implemented in practice. I theorize that the
stringency of performance systems is a function of learning over time through use.
Systems may be initially stringent (when used to address strategic behavior and
performance lapses), but stagnate later—rarely reaching the maximum stringency level.
To test this theory, I examine the adoption and stringency of performance-based funding
in public higher education.
Adoption of Performance Systems
The decision to adopt a new policy rarely results from one factor. Rather, it stems
from a combination of factors. Prior research distinguishes between internal and external
factors (McLendon et al., 2006). Internal factors are unique to the particular entity that is
adopting a new policy. Examples of internal factors to an organization are its culture,
communication, employee motivation, among others (Bashir & Verma, 2019). Other
factors might be external to the entity. When the adopting entity is a state, the external
factors are commonly referred to as interstate factors. Understanding how each of these
factors affect the decision to adopt a performance system will allow researchers to depict
a more comprehensive picture of the process.
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In the past few decades, New Public Management (NPM) reforms have placed
increased emphasis on performance as a means of instilling greater accountability in the
public sector. This emphasis has resulted in a shift away from processes and structures to
organizational results and outcomes (Kettl, 2005). Performance systems have been
adopted to make organizations more business-like in an overall effort to enhance public
service delivery (Walker, Boyne, & Avellaneda, 2011).
NPM principles have inspired multiple policies at different levels of government.
At the federal level, policies such as the National Performance Review (NPR) and the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) require that all federal agencies adopt
strategic plans and performance goals and then report on their achievements. NPMinspired initiatives at the local level included customer satisfaction surveys, focus groups
with users and representatives, joint decision-making between citizens and agencies,
privatization, contracting, and outsourcing (Walker, Damanpour & Deveece, 2011).
Other NPM policies used performance data to inform budgetary allocations, known as
performance-based budgeting (PBB) policies (Kioko, Marlow, Markin, Moody, Smith, &
Zhao, 2011). The research literature on the actual effectiveness of performance systems
has produced mixed evidence. Some studies found that institutions that engage in
performance management practices do perform better (Sun & Van Ryzin, 2014; Patrick
& Rollins, 2015), while other studies detected no noticeable increase in institutional
performance (Shin, 2010). Yet, undoubtedly, the overall impetus behind the adoption of
performance systems is to improve the performance of public organizations (Newcomer
& Caudle, 2011; Rabovsky, 2012). In this sense, underperformance of public institutions
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should be viewed as a precursor to the adoption of a performance system. This rationale
led to the following hypothesis:
H1: Achievement deficits are associated with the adoption of a performance
system.
Performance systems in the public sector are adopted through the enactment of
specific laws or other formal legal requirements. In the United States, Republicans are
consistently associated with conservative ideology, championing smaller and less active
government, noninterventionist economic policies, and unrestricted commercial markets.
In this sense, legislatures dominated by members of the Republican Party are more likely
to adopt policies that are indirectly skeptical of state bureaucracy. By contrast, Democrats
are associated with more liberal ideology that advocates for government programs to
alleviate social disparities. Thus, legislatures dominated by members of the Democratic
Party tend to have higher levels of state spending on public education and welfare (Treier
& Hillygus, 2009; Lupton, Myers, & Thornton, 2017; McLendon et al., 2006). In general,
conservative policymakers (i.e., Republicans) are cautious about expanding the role of
government, whereas liberals (i.e., Democrats) hesitate to rely on market-based policies
(Butler, Volden, Dunes, & Shor, 2017). Therefore, performance systems— NPM-inspired
policies that emphasize market principles—are likely to be popular among conservative
policy-makers (Lapenta, Fattore, & Dubois 2012).
For the purposes of this research, I will use the classical definition of political
ideology which is an orientation to political parties or interests (Martin, 2015). Prior
research has produced extensive evidence on the role of ideology on policy outcomes.
Examples include health insurance coverage (Cummins, 2011), biotechnology (Harris,
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2015), and state lotteries (Jensen, 2003). In state politics, the ideological affiliation of the
Governor often accurately predicts the types of policies adopted in that state. A study by
Julnes and Mixcoatl (2006) demonstrated how state governors were the most influential
political figures in the state due to their authority over budget allocations, selection of key
employees, and setting of policy and program priorities, a finding that is consistent with
previous studies (King, Zeckhauser, & Kim, 2002). Thus, the second hypothesis of the
present study tests the effect of another internal factor: the ideology of state-elected
public officials. Given that NPM emphasizes enhanced performance by injecting market
mechanisms into public service delivery, and that conservative policymakers favor small
government that avoids intervening in the market, we expect that legislatures dominated
by conservative elected officials are more likely to adopt performance management
systems.
H2: A conservative ideology is associated with the adoption of performance systems.
In addition to internal factors, policy adoption might be determined by external
factors created by geographical policy diffusion. Policy diffusion refers to the situation,
where “one government’s policy choices [are] being influenced by the choices of other
governments” (Shipan & Volden, 2012, p. 789). In the classic view of policy diffusion, at
the state level, policy adoption is influenced by geographically bordering states that
previously adopted that policy (Walker, 1969). The concept was further developed by
Berry and Berry (1990), who defined policy adoption resulting from regional diffusion
(i.e., the influence of next-door or geographic neighbors) as horizontal diffusion.
The policy diffusion theory has been widely used in different contexts. For
instance, the likelihood of adopting antismoking policies has increased as a result of
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neighboring states passing such policies (Shipan & Volden, 2006). Other policy areas
where the geographical diffusion pattern has been studied include state lottery policies
(Berry & Berry, 1990; Mooney, 2001), electronic-government (i.e., “the government’s
use of technology to enhance the access and delivery of government and services to
citizens, business partners, employees, other agencies and entities”; Layne & Lee, 2001,
p. 123) (Norris & Moon, 2005; Lee, Chang, & Berry, 2011), and climate change
(Matisoff, 2008). In the context of education reforms, external factors (e.g., regional
diffusion) have proven to be positively associated with policy adoption (Mintrom &
Vergari, 1998).
The prevalent diffusion of performance systems is considered to be among the
most noteworthy advances in public administration in the 20 years since the 1968
Minnowbrook Conference (Monhiyan, Fernandez, Kim, LeRoux, Piotrowski, Wright, &
Yang, 2011). Berry (1994) found a positive relationship between the adoption of strategic
planning for states when neighboring states adopted such a policy. Diffusion of
performance innovation has been shown to be positively correlated with the transfer of
public managers (Yi, Berry, & Chen, 2019). More recently, however, research in the
context of higher education has revealed a negative relationship between adoption in a
state when neighboring states have installed the policy (Li, 2017).
This chapter’s third hypothesis draws from horizontal diffusion theory (Walker,
1969; Berry & Berry, 1990). The logic behind the horizontal diffusion theory is that
public policies spread among states where a regional leader adopts a given policy first
and neighboring states within the geographic region follow.
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H3: Adoption of a performance system is more likely if there is a prior adopter in
the proximity.
In summary, internal and external factors affect the decision to adopt a new policy
(McLendon et al., 2006). The present study sought to test two internal factors:
performance deficiency and political ideology. Specifically, I expected that lapses in
performance, and prevalence of conservative political ideology among elected officials,
would be positively associated with the adoption of a performance system. The present
study also tested the effect of one external factor—geographical diffusion, which assumes
that a state will be more likely to adopt a policy if neighboring states have previously
adopted a similar policy.
System Stringency of Performance Systems
After a PMS is adopted, what factors affect the stringency of the performance
systems? A performance system establishes performance goals for the program or agency
(Moynihan, 2006). Therefore, the factors affecting the stringency of the performance
criteria (i.e., the system configuration) are important. The level of stringency of a
performance system will impact how performance information is framed, which will then
impact the success of the entire system (Battaglio & Hall, 2018).
I drew from principal-agent theory to formulate expectations about the degree of
stringency of a performance system. In general, the theory describes a contractual
relationship between a principal and an agent, where the principal establishes specific
terms and conditions about agent behavior (Perrow, 1986). In the case of performance
systems in the public sector, the principal is the politically conservative elected official
who adopts an NPM-inspired policy, whereas the agent is the government entity being
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subject to the performance system. Performance management guarantees the recovery of
the control over policy-making for elected officials (Moynihan, 2008).
Researchers have applied the principal-agent model in various contexts, including
examination of a job-training program in the United States (Courty & Marshcke, 2003),
evaluation of the pharmaceutical-patient relationship (Chressanthis, Dahan, & Fandl,
2015), and assessment of e-government innovations (Heeks & Santos, 2009), to name a
few. This theoretical framework has also been used extensively in performance literature:
Tandberg and Hillman (2014) utilized the model to explain the impact of performancebased funding in higher education. Ferris (1992) analyzed educational performance;
Selviaridis and Norrman (2015) explored its effect on performance-based contracts.
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) studied results-oriented performance measurements in the
federal government.
Principal-agent theory is multifaceted. The one pertinent to performance systems
in public higher education relates to information asymmetry. The principal’s access to
information is limited and the actions of the agent must be closely monitored, which is
costly and subject to time constraints (Jacobides & Croson, 2001). Given the costs
associated with monitoring agent behavior, the states rely on few performance indicators
to measure agent performance without capturing true output (Nisar, 2015). The principal
can change the measurement system as new information becomes available after a
measure has been enacted (Courty & Marshchke, 2003).
In other words, the principal might make the system more stringent over time.
Prior research shows that the level of stringency of a performance system increases, in
particular, when the principal realizes that the agent is “gaming the system”. Gaming is a
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practice that refers to manipulative actions that aim create the appearance that outcomes
have been achieved” (Legge, 2016). This practice has been recognized as a concern in a
performance system (Durant, 2009). Gaming occurs after the agent discovers ways to
manipulate the system (Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). Therefore, time is a key aspect of
the principal’s reaction to performance of the agent.
My hypothesis was that stringency is a function of experience with the system
rather than something static that is predefined in the adoption phase. As time passes, both
principal and agent learn more about the system. The agent discovers ways to game the
rules; the principal, in turn, responds by tightening the monitoring standard. Thus, the
expectation was that the stringency of performance systems will increase over time due to
learning effects.
H4: The stringency of a performance system increases with the duration of use.
Although the principal could continuously adjust the system’s stringency, will this
process last indefinitely? The diffusion of a policy adoption follows an S-curve, which is
characterized by a slow beginning, rapid expansion, and tapering off (Glick & Hayes,
1991). I argue that the adjustment does not continue forever and, in fact, reaches a
climax. For elected officials and public managers, the performance systems have
“symbolic benefits”: performance systems allow officials and managers to demonstrate—
to a diverse group of constituencies—that government is being managed in a “rational,
efficient, and results-oriented way and that bureaucrats are being held accountable for
their performance” (Moynihan, 2005, p. 227). Similarly, Feldman, and March (1981, p.
182) discussed symbolic benefits of performance information for the decision-makers:
“information use symbolizes a commitment to rational choice” (p. 182). In other words,
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the acquisition of performance data gives legitimacy to the decision-making process
because a conscious effort to make the right decision occurs, regardless of whether or not
the data are actually being used.
Based on the literature on symbolic effects of policies, I anticipated that
stringency of performance systems will eventually stagnate. The are many plausible
reasons for this to happen, for instance, the policy may have been poorly designed from
its inception. Another reason is that the policy may be highly contested and loses its
momentum once the contestations disappear. For the purposes of this research, the reason
I will assume is that the reasons stagnation takes place is that politicians stop directing
efforts to reconfigure the system and simply choose to retain it to demonstrate that the
government is acting to address the problem. Another explanation is that the issue at hand
might become less salient among the citizenry. This could occur because the citizens feel
satisfied and pressure to resolve the issue diminishes, or because there is a competing
issue to which they must direct their attention. Thus, most systems never reach the
maximum stringency level. I expected that the relationship between years of use and
system stringency would be nonlinear and eventually reach a saturation point. To reach a
tipping point means to reach a point where people involved see the need to reframe the
issue or take another course (Gladwell, 2000). Such point occurs when policy initiators
feel that they have satisfied the requirement to act or turn to other, more pressing issues,
and let the system stagnate.
H5: The stringency of performance systems reaches a saturation point.
In sum, I anticipated that the stringency level would change over time. As
principal-agent theory suggests, it is likely that stringency will increase with the years of
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use. The expectation was that the principal would tighten the performance standard to
counter the possible gaming behavior of the agent. I also predicted that the adjustments
would reach a tipping point, based on the symbolic benefits rationale.
Data and Methods
Research Setting
The above hypotheses have been tested in the context of performance-based
funding in higher education. In the United States, there are more than 700 public fouryear colleges or universities serving over eight million students (U.S. Department of
Education, 2018). The significant impact of universities on the economic well-being of
the individual and on the overall evolution of society has been discussed extensively
(Gooden, 2014; Crow & Shangraw, 2016). Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Boston are examples
of communities where institutions of higher education have played a pivotal role in
economic development through invention and commercialization of new technologies
and partnerships between universities and local governments (Gordon, 2010).
Many factors influence adoption of new funding mechanisms in universities.
These include: globalization, movements to reinvent government, competing financial
objectives in state budgets, K-12 reforms that intensified focus on the education sector,
changes in state political leadership, and failure to deliver under the previous funding
model systems (McLendon et al., 2006). The output model relies on business value, such
as return on investment, efficiency, and competitiveness (Todd & Anderson, 2016),
which became inevitable.
The quantitative analysis in the present study draws on data from all 4-year,
public, doctoral-degree granting universities in the United States that are classified as
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Carnegie-Highest-Research activity (R1). The Carnegie Classification system has been
the leading framework for acknowledging, describing, and labeling institutional diversity
in U.S. higher education for more than 45 years (Shulman, 2001). R1 institutions are
universities that graduate at least 20 doctoral students and have a minimum of $5 million
in research expenditures. Public R1 institutions were selected to ensure that the
institutions shared similar characteristics and mission, which helped me avoid issues
related to sample bias. The sample consists of data from 40 states with 82 institutions
amassed from 2000 to 2015. Given that performance-based funding was adopted at the
state level, the unit of analysis is the state. Figure 5 presents the states with a
performance-based funding (PBF) program as of 2015, along with each state’s year of
adoption. The data for the analysis came from different sources, including the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System, National Conference of State Legislatures, and
the State Higher Education Finance, among others.
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Figure 5. States with PBF as of 2015 by Year of Adoption

Measuring Adoption and Stringency
The dependent variable in the adoption model is dichotomous: the variable
assumes a value of 1 for the years when the state had a PBF in place and as 0 otherwise.
To operationalize the stringency of the adopted PBF model in a state, I developed an
additive index, called the Public Funding Uncertainty Index (PFUI). The index consists
of five dimensions. I reviewed all performance-based systems currently installed to arrive
at the dimensions. Each dimension is discussed in detail below and described in Table 7.
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Table 7. PFUI: Performance-based funding Dimensions
Dimension

Definition

Sub-Categories

States (as of 2015)

Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
a. basic: compares institutions
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
over time and only considers their Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio,
own past performance
Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and
Virginia
I. Benchmarking

II. Funding
Methodology

refers to the comparisons
that the PBF relies on to
gauge the eligibility of an
institution for funding

b. industry-standard: performance
goals are based on what are
considered possible outcomes for
institutions based on certain
criteria

Missouri and Pennsylvania

c. dynamic: includes other factors
in addition to the institution’s
own performance

Arkansas, Florida, and Oklahoma

captures the methodology
a. fixed percentage
used to allocate dollars for
an institution’s budget on a
performance basis
b. lump sum
c. formula

Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Virginia
Utah
Oklahoma
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Dimension

III. Impact to Base

IV. Complexity

Definition

examines the impact to the
institution’s base budget

based on the total number
of key performance
indicators (KPIs). KPIs are
used to measure the
university’s performance

refers to whether or not
institutions are punished if
they do not meet the
performance requirements,
V. Penalty for
Underperformance or if they perform
significantly worse than as
compared to other
institutions

Sub-Categories

States (as of 2015)

a. incremental to the institution’s
base budget but does not remain
in the base

Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and
Utah.

b. incremental and PBF funds
become part of the base

Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Mississippi. New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee

c. non-dollar based

Virginia

a. five KPIs or less

Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, New
Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon

b. more than five KPIs

Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia

a. penalty

Florida

b. no penalty

Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan. Minnesota, Missouri,
Mississippi. New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia
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The first dimension refers to the mechanism of benchmarking. PBF relies on
comparisons to gauge the eligibility of an institution for funding. There are various ways
to establish benchmarks, and the choice of a benchmarking mechanism affects the level
of budget uncertainty that PBF creates for institutions in each state’s higher education
system. Some PBF models are based on comparison over time and only consider the
institution’s past performance. In this case, the degree of uncertainty is low because the
institution can predict the level of growth it must achieve in the following year to surpass
its performance in the current year. This is the case for most states. For example, in 2015,
out of 20 states that had a PBF model installed, 15 followed this benchmarking
mechanism. These states were: Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.
A higher level of uncertainty is associated with performance measures that tie
performance of one institution to factors other than its own performance. These states are
considered to have a dynamic benchmarking mechanism. In 2015, Florida, Arkansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania utilized this approach.
PBF models in Missouri and Pennsylvania introduced a benchmarking system that
follows “industry standards”: performance goals are based on possible outcomes for the
institutions based on certain criteria. Missouri’s performance measures are evaluated
based on each institution’s improvement on performance from the previous year.
However, this system also has a component of “sustained excellence,” comparing
performance to an established benchmark rather than improvement over the previous year
(Department of Higher Education and Workforce Development, 2016). Pennsylvania’s
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system measures university performance based on institution-specific goals, but also
against external comparisons or expectations that are based on national studies
(Mansfield University, 2012). The industry-standard benchmarking mechanism
introduces an increased level of budget uncertainty, because institutions are not only held
to their own performance, but also to the performance of a much larger population of
institutions.
The Arkansas PBF model evaluates performance based on the number of
bachelor’s degrees awarded. The current year’s total bachelor’s degrees awarded is
compared against the institution’s own growth from the base-year. This PBF model
awards compensatory points for percentage of undergraduate students receiving Pell
Grants (State of Arkansas, 2017). Thus, institutions with more students eligible for Pell
Grants have an advantage. I consider this to be a source of increased uncertainty, given
that the number of students with Pell Grants is beyond an institution’s control.
The pre-established benchmark provides an added level of uncertainty because
institutions may be set out to be penalized if their results are below this goal. If the preestablished benchmark is unknown or released late, institutions may also have a hard time
achieving this goal. Oklahoma’s performance funding formula incorporates an equity
component. The goal is to help institutions that have historically fallen behind their peers.
Therefore, institutions are based on their performance, but they are also compared to their
peers within the state to ensure similar institutions reach the same performance levels.
For example, according to the Florida Board of Governors website Florida’s PBF
measures performance based on each institution’s individual improvement, but also based
on benchmarks for excellence established by Florida’s governing body—based on
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historical performance of the state institutions. States that utilize this dynamic approach
to PBF, whereby the funding level is based on a combination of factors rather than solely
on the institution’s own performance, have introduced more uncertainty into their higher
education systems.
The benchmarking mechanism that ties performance to other institutions within
the same system contains a higher uncertainty because institutions within a system may
be very distinct from one another. Some institutions may have a competitive advantage to
perform better due to factors other than the performance itself. The industry-standard
benchmarking system, however, does compare institutions that meet certain criteria,
which makes the comparisons fair and equitable.
To gauge the level of uncertainty created using different benchmarking systems, a
variable with three realizations was used. The benchmarking system is coded as 1, when
performance was measured against an institution’s own performance in the past, coded as
2 when performance was based on an “industry-standard,” or coded as 3 when the PBF
mechanism used a dynamic benchmark tied to performance of other institutions in the
system. A value of 0 was used to denote the absence of PBF implementation.
The amount of funding allocated through PBF differs across states, as well as the
mechanism used. This affects the ability of institutions to predict their future financial
streams. The second PFUI dimension captures the methodology used to allocate dollars
on a performance basis. The present research revealed that funds are typically allocated
through a percentage of total budget. Indiana, for example, allocates only 5% of the total
budget based on performance, Oregon allocates 1%, Illinois allocates 0.5%, and
Michigan allocates 11%, while Tennessee allocates 100% of the funds to state
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universities based on performance. Other states do not allocate funds based on a fixed
percentage—rather, they allocate a lump sum amount. Utah’s PBF model, initiated in
2013, began as a $1 million pilot bonus—a one-time, performance-based—funding
program. This amount was later raised to $1.5 million in 2014 and $5 million in 2015
(Utah Foundation, 2014).
To achieve equity between and among all state institutions, Oklahoma uses a
“Weight of Performance Measure Multipliers,” where each performance indicator is
assigned a weight. These indicators can vary from year-to-year for institutions that are
below one standard deviation of their peers (Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education, 2018). Massachusetts PBF program also utilizes a complex formula of metrics
and weights (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2015). The PBF in Kansas
uses a formula to determine how much new funding each institution is entitled to, based
on their progress toward reaching performance goals. Institutions may be entitled to
100%, 90%, 75%, or no new funding, based on the Board’s assessment of the
institution’s effort toward meeting their goal (Kansas Board of Regents, 2017). These
formulas introduce a higher level of uncertainty because institutions may not have access
to all the information required to devise the formula.
The lump sum amount is the approach that creates the least degree of uncertainty
because institutions know in advance the total dollar amount that could potentially be
awarded and could, therefore, decide if it is worthwhile to use time and resources to
emphasize performance. The percentage approach increases the uncertainty in the system
but still allows institutions to anticipate what amount from their budget will be distributed
based on performance. Therefore, it is easy to anticipate what level of funding is at stake.
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The percentage, however, varies depending on the total budget base amount, which is
unknown from year-to-year. Lastly, the formula approach provides the most uncertainty.
Because there are multiple factors to consider, anticipating the amount of funds allocated
based on performance becomes a difficult task.
The second PFUI dimension is coded as 1 if the funds from the PBF are a lump
sum amount, coded as 2 if they are based on a percentage, and coded as 3 if they are
based on a formula.
The third PFUI dimension captures the impact to the base budget of the
institution. The extent to which PBF impacts an institution’s budget varies with regard to
the institution’s base budget. In some states, performance funds are incremental (i.e., in
addition to each institution’s base budget in subsequent years), but do not remain in the
institution’s base budget. This is the case for Arizona, Oregon, and Utah. Another
possibility is for funds allocated through PBF to be an increase to the new budget year,
and to become part of the permanent base budget for the following year, which was the
case exhibited most often among the various institutions. Fourteen out of the 20 states
had a PBF mechanism in 2015.
Virginia’s PBF model is a unique case because the reward for the state’s
performance is not presented in the form of dollars, but rather in the form of
administrative autonomy. Financial benefits are provided on a case-by-case basis (Office
of the Washington State Auditor, 2014).
The third PFUI dimension is coded as 0 when there is no PBF; coded as 1 if the
model entails one-time funds that are not added to the institution’s base budget the
following year, and coded as 2 if the funds are incremental and added to the base
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budget. Additionally, the third PFUI dimension was codes as 1.5 for cases in which PBF
was a combination of codes 1 and 2 (50-50 distribution) or for cases such as Virginia.
To tackle the level of complexity of the PBF model, a fourth dimension was
included—based on the total number of performance indicators. Each state typically
establishes its own set of indicators to determine institutions’ eligibility for performance
funding. Thirteen states, including Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Missouri, evaluate
more than five indicators, whereas the other seven states examine less than five
indicators. These states include Arizona, Ohio, and Massachusetts. Given that a larger
number of indicators requires more evaluation and increased effort to assess, systems
with a larger number of indictors are considered more stringent. In terms of coding, a
value of 1 was assigned to PBF models with up to 5 indicators, and a value of 2 was
assigned to models consisting of more than 5 indicators. As before, a value of 0 denotes
the lack of PBF in the state.
The last PFUI dimension captures the extent to which states may impose penalties
for underperformance. Institutions might be punished if they do not meet the performance
requirements, or if they are the lowest performers in the ranking system as compared to
other institutions. For example, in the state of Florida, institutions are evaluated based on
excellence or improvement for each metric. When an institution does not meet the
required number of points and is one of the three lowest performers within the state
university system, it is not entitled to the state performance funds, and must therefore
contribute funds from its own base budget to make up a pool of performance funds to be
distributed between all universities. A dichotomous variable was used to indicate whether
or not the state PBF model requires institutions to make funds available to contribute to
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the pool, based on the rules of the model. Institutions were coded as 1 if they are not
required to contribute any funds at risk due to underperformance and coded as 2 if they
are subject to a penalty for underperformance.
The analysis in the present study utilizes the additive index as the dependent
variable in the stringency model. The additive index for the year 2015 reveals that Florida
was the state with the highest stringency level of 8, whereas Arizona and Oregon had the
lowest stringency level score of 4.5. This differs from the year 2000, where South
Carolina had the most stringent PBF with a score of 7, and Arkansas, Colorado, and New
Jersey had the least stringent system, with scores of 3.5 each. In the year 2015, excluding
states with no PBF in place (which would score 0 on the index), the mode was 6.5 (for
Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, and Tennessee). The
mode in 2000 was 3.5 (for Arkansas, Colorado, and New Jersey). This suggests that
stringency increased over time. In addition, 30 states scored 0 in the year 2000, while this
number decreased to 19 in the year 2015.
The Cronbach’s Alpha for the index was 0.9465. The high alpha suggests the
dimensions are measuring the same underlying concept and supports the creation of an
additive index. For standardization purposes, the values from the variables for
Benchmarking and Percentage were divided by 2 to have the same multiplier (i.e., the
same range for minimum and maximum values). An index was also created using the
factor analysis principal component technique. The findings yielded the same significant
results using the additive index and when using the principal component analysis. Table
8 presents the information from the principal component analysis.
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Table 8. Principal Component Analysis
Variable Name

Variable Definition

Factor Uniqueness
Loading
Score

BenchmarkingParameters used to measure the performance of the 0.9457
institutions.
0= no PBF
1= when performance is measured against
institution’s own performance in the past
2= when performance is based on an “industry
standard”
3= when performance uses a dynamic benchmark

0.1057

Methodology used to allocate dollars associated
0.9635
with the performance system.
0= no PBF
1= if the funds from the PBF are a lump sum
amount;
2=if they are based on a percentage
3= if they are based on a formula
0.9767
Impact to baseImpact of the funding to the base budget of the
institution.
0= no PBF
1=if the model entails one-time funds that are not
added to the institution’s base budget the following
year;
1.5 = when there’s a combination of both (50-50
distribution)
2= if the funds are incremental and added to the
base
Complexity Captures the number of key performance indicators 0.9093
used by the system.
0= no PBF
1= if the PBF model entails from 1 to 5 indicators
2= if the models consist of more than 5 indicators

0.0716

The extent to which states may impose penalties for 0.9520
underperformance.
0= no PBF
1=if they are not required to put up any funds at risk
due to underperformance
2=if they do have to face a penalty for
underperformance
Eigen Value: 4.5096

0.0937

Percentage

Penalty
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0.0461

0.1732

Variable Name

Variable Definition

Factor Uniqueness
Loading
Score

Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.9465
The Principal component technique takes into account the information offered by
many observations by utilizing a more restricted group of assembled dimensions which
become essentially replacements for the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The
reduced number of variables allows for clearer comparisons across samples. It also
enhances the consequent statistical analyses and, when using multiple regressions, where
there are many explanatory variables, it helps avoid the problem of exploitation of
associations by chance (Yang & Miller, 2008).
Yang and Miller (2008) explained that a shortcoming of using principal
component analysis is that it was not invariant as it related to scaling decisions. They
explained that the higher the variance of one variable relative to others, the more
influence it would have on the direction of the principal component. Because the
“percentage” variable is measured differently, and in order to avoid any issues due to
measurement, the variables were standardized to create the index using the principal
component factor. Because the variables were standardized, principal components with
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were retained (Yang & Miller, 2008). Therefore, the results
from the principal component analysis suggest a solution of one principal component. By
using a promax rotation, the factor loadings were obtained. The results suggest the
creation of an index based on all five dimensions with high loadings (all greater than
0.90).
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Independent Variables
To determine the number of years the PBF was present, each state’s performance
system was analyzed for the period of 2000-2015 and coded based on year of adoption
and the documents reviewed. To test Hypothesis 1, a proxy for the state’s performance
system was required. Initially, I planned to use the Measuring Up score. This was an
effort from the federal government to create a National Report Card for higher education
institutions. However, the score was not available for all the years examined in this
dissertation, and thus it was not a viable option. The best indicator found to capture the
performance of the state higher education system was the average ranking as measured
by the U.S. News Survey report. The survey is administered to top academics (presidents,
provosts, and deans of admissions). It seeks to explore the aspects of their peer
institutions based on a scale from 1 to 5. During the most recent year (i.e., 2015) this
study examined, the top performing state, as measured by U.S. News, was Minnesota—
with a score of 3.6. The lowest performing was Mississippi with a score of 2.3. The
average performance score was 2.81, whereas the median and mode were both 2.8.
To operationalize the dominant ideology in the state legislature, I used the
political party affiliation of the governor and the percentage of Republicans in the
legislature (Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008; Lavertu & Moynihan, 2012a). The assumption
was that Republicans are the conservative party, while Democrats are the more liberal
party. To gauge whether the adoption of PBF was a result of policy diffusion from
neighboring states (Hypothesis 3), I included a variable in the model that was derived
using the ratio of neighboring states with PBF over the total number of neighboring
states. The expectation was that the higher the proportion of surrounding states that have
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adopted a PBF, the higher the probability of the state in question moving to adopt the
program. Other studies have used a similar approach (Shipan & Volden, 2006; Li, 2017;
Mintrom & Vergari, 1998).
To test Hypothesis 5, I included a squared term for the years the performance
system was in effect. I argue that the relationship between stringency and the number of
years the PBF was in place is nonlinear. The expectation was that the longer the PBF was
in place, the less stringent the system would become after it reaches a tipping point.
This analysis also included a number of control variables. I used the total number
of legislators to assess the complexity to reach a decision. The larger the number of
people involved in decision making, the more complex the process was, and therefore the
more stringent the PBF system became. To account for the state’s reliance on personal
income and sales tax, a ration of these two variables over the total revenue was included.
More diversified revenue states with a higher proportion of income tax revenue or sales
tax revenue would be less inclined to have a PBF.
Another control variable that was included was the proportion of higher education
total expenses over the states’ total expenses. The higher the proportion of expenses that
were directed toward higher education, the less likely the state was to adopt. Similarly,
the higher the proportion of expenses directed toward higher education, the more
stringent the systems would be. Finally, the census region and unemployment rates were
included. Regression results are shown, including the yearly “fixed effects,” to account
for unobserved factors that are relatively stable over time, such as recessions and other
economic shocks. Appendix A has information regarding the measures and their sources.
The descriptive statistics for all variables are listed in Table 9.
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics, Adoption and Stringency Models
Variable

Mean SD

Min

Max

Obs

1

PFUI

1.51

2.68

0.00

8.67

624

1.00

PBF

0.28

0.45

0.00

1.00

624

0.91

US News

2.93

0.32

2.20

3.90

608 -0.11 -0.17

% of Neighboring
states with
PBF/Total
Neighboring States

0.24

0.21

0.00

1.00

624 -0.01 -0.06 -0.20

1.00

0.48

0.15

0.11

0.83

608

0.35

0.31

0.04

0.21

1.00

0.51

0.50

0.00

1.00

624

0.07

0.09

-0.12

0.05

0.28

1.00

Yrs. PBF Present 2.25

5.36

0.00

34.00

624

0.61

0.68

-0.27

-0.02

0.26

0.03

1.00

148 44.00 49.00 253.00 624

0.00 -0.06

0.04

0.00

0.01

0.04

-0.09 1.00

6.09

1.93

2.20

13.90

608

-.01 -0.01 -0.18

0.05

-0.08 -0.06

0.41

0.18

0.00

0.87

622

0.07

0.05

0.26

-0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.20 0.02 -0.04

1.00

0.37

0.31

0.00

2.36

622

0.19

0.22

-0.28

0.00

0.17

0.12

0.66 -0.03 0.02

-0.59

1.00

0.13

0.04

0.03

0.28

624 -0.11 -0.10 -0.20

0.34

0.29

0.18

-0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.16

0.17

West

0.21

0.40

0.00

1.00

624 -0.01 0.03

0.12

-0.09

-0.7

-0.07 -0.06 -0.50 0.07

0.04

-0.04 -0.11 1.00

Midwest

0.26

0.44

0.00

1.00

624

0.15

0.27

0.01

0.27

0.01

0.18

-0.10

Northeast

0.13

0.33

0.00

1.00

624 -0.12 -0.15

0.08

-0.30 -0.31 -0.03 -0.14 0.40

0.00

0.13

-0.15 -0.56 -0.19 0.23

South

0.41

0.49

0.00

1.00

624 -0.06 -0.06 -0.40

0.27

0.03

-0.28

0.22

Republican
Legislature
Republican
Governor
Total Number of
Legislators
Unemployment
Rate
Personal
Income/Total
Revenue
Sales Tax
Revenue/Total
Revenue
Higher Education
Total Expenses

0.16

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1.00
1.00

0.03
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0.06

0.05

0.08

0.07

0.08

1.00

0.03 -0.09

0.10

1.00

0.15 -0.30 1.00
1.00

0.34 -0.42 -0.49 -0.32 1.00

Results
Adoption of PBF
Given the binary nature of our adoption variable, I estimated a series of logit
models (Long & Freese, 2014). Table 10 presents the results for the adoption model.
Three variables are significant: the performance of the higher education system, the
presence of a Republican governor, and the percentage of Republicans in the legislature.
As expected, the performance of the system is negatively related to adoption—states with
struggling higher education systems are more likely to adopt performance-based funding.
Similarly, having a Republican governor and a legislature dominated by the Republican
Party are both positively associated with the decision to adopt performance-based
funding. When using the fixed year effects, the diffusion proxy is negatively
significant—a surprising finding because it contradicts Walker’s (1969) theory, which
specifies that the probability of a state adopting a new policy is higher if other states have
already adopted the policy.
Table 10. Logit Results, Adoption Model
Year fixed
effects: no

Year fixed
effects: yes

Marginal
Effects
dy/dx

Average U.S. News
Performance

-7.76**
(2.02)

-6.09**
(1.99)

-0.74
(0.35)

Republican Governor

1.07**
(0.40)

1.06*
(0.44)

0.10
(0.60)

Percent of Republican
Legislature

6.08**
(2.30)

4.21
(2.70)

0.58
(0.34)

Ratio of Neighboring States
with PBF over Total No. of
States

-1.09
(1.28)

-3.81*
(1.61)

-0.10
(0.13)

ADOPTION
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Year fixed
effects: no

Year fixed
effects: yes

Marginal
Effects
dy/dx

Total Number of Legislators

-0.00
(0.02)

-0.01
(0.02)

-0.00
(0.00)

Unemployment Rate

-0.25*
(0.10)

-0.18
(0.26)

-0.02
(0.01)

Personal Income/Total
Revenue

6.21^
(3.35)

4.37
(3.77)

0.59
(0.41)

Sales Tax/Total Revenue

5.54*
(2.67)

6.86^
(3.85)

0.53
(0.36)

Higher Education Total
Expenses

-29.61**
(7.70)

-17.62^
(9.73)

-2.81
(1.54)

Midwest

1.88
(2.05)

1.91
(2.06)

0.26
(0.38)

Northeast

-3.17
(2.74)

-3.14
(2.82)

-0.15
(0.10)

South

-1.92
(2.05)

-1.99
(2.06)

-0.17
(0.19)

0.74

0.75

(0.09)

(0.08)

LR test f rho=0: chibar2(01)=

147.31

154.25

Prob>=chibar2=

0.000

0.000

Log likelihood=

-170.09

-157.96

Wald chi2(12)=

52.83

63.21

574

574

ADOPTION

Rho

N
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01

The results of the logit regression are expressed in terms of odds ratio. For each
additional point in the Average U.S. News ranking, the odds of adopting a performance
system are 7.76 times lower. Similarly, if a Republican governor is in office and a higher
percentage of Republicans are in the legislature, the odds of adopting are 1.07 and 6.08
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larger, respectively. Lastly, when there is a higher proportion of neighboring states with
PBF, the odds of adoption decrease by 3.81 times. Logit assumes that all other variables
are held constant.
I also explored marginal effects. A marginal effect measures the change in the
probability of an outcome for a change in the independent variable, holding all other
independent variables constant at specific values (Long & Freese, 2014). From the
marginal effects, I gathered that as performance of the higher education system increases,
the probability of adopting decreases -0.74. Whereas, the other two main independent
variables of interest, the presence of a Republican governor and the percentage of
Republicans in the legislature, are associated with an increase in the probability of
adoption. As in the logit models, the diffusion proxy is associated with a decreased
probability of adoption.
Stringency of PBF
The stringency model was estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, calculating the effects of each independent variable on of the Performance
Funding Uncertainty Index (PFUI). Table 11 below shows the results. The independent
variables explain 0.57 and 0.59 of the variation of the PFUI for the models with no year
fixed effects and with positive year fixed effects, respectively.
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Table 11. Regression Results, Stringency Model
Year
fixed
effects:
no

Year
fixed
effects:
yes

Years PBF is Present

0.76**
(0.17)

0.75**
(0.17)

Years PBF is Present Squared

-0.02*
(0.01)

-0.02*
(0.01)

Average U.S. News Performance

-0.40
(0.60)

-0.20
(0.68)

Republican Governor

0.25
(0.28)

0.20
(0.28)

Percent of Republican Legislature

4.03**
(1.51)

3.59^
(1.96)

Ratio of Neighboring States with PBF over
Total No. of States

0.41
(0.85)

-0.59
(1.18)

Total Number of Legislators

0.00
(0.01)

0.00
(0.01)

Unemployment Rate

-0.03
(0.04)

0.12
(0.12)

Personal Income/Total Revenue

2.73*
(1.26)

2.14
(1.40)

Sales Tax/Total Revenue

1.37
(2.30)

1.29
(2.32)

Higher Education Total Expenses

-7.44
(5.08)

-3.93
(5.39)

Midwest

-0.16
(0.64)

-0.09
(0.60)

Northeast

-0.31
(0.88)

-0.23
(0.74)

South

-0.08
(0.51)

0.74
(0.50)

STRINGENCY
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Year
fixed
effects:
no

Year
fixed
effects:
yes

R-sq: within

0.39

0.41

R-sq: between

0.81

0.82

R-sq: overall

0.57

0.59

Wald chi2(14)

531.70

5047.43

Prob>chi2

0.00

0.00

Sigma_u

0.75

0.77

Sigma_e

1.66

1.65

Rho

0.17

0.18

N

574

574

STRINGENCY

^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01
The number of years the PBF is present is consistently significant with a small
coefficient (<1). The coefficient for the squared number of years variable is even smaller
(<0.02) and also significant, suggesting that the stringency of the performance system
diminishes over time. Figure 6 shows the trajectory of the stringency. The graph is a Stata
predication about the anticipated trajectory for the level of stringency as time passes.
What is exhibited is an increasingly stringent system as time passes, which reaches a
tipping point at the 17-year mark, after which stringency is likely to decrease. Another
important aspect to note is that the percent of Republicans in the legislature was positive;
that is, Republicans in the legislature result in an increase of 4.03 units on the level of
stringency. The other main independent variables were not significant.
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Figure 6. Predictive Margins: Anticipated trajectory of Stringency Level vs. Time

As previously mentioned, the coefficients shown in both models are expressed in
terms of random effects, as supported by the Hausman test. For the adoption model, the
performance proxy results continue to be significant under fixed effects, as well as the
Republican Governor and the percentage of Republicans in the legislature. The effect,
however, is much larger using the fixed effects (the coefficient is -13.17 compared to the
random effect coefficient of 7.76). In all cases, the coefficients of the significant variables
are larger under the fixed effect approach. In the case of the stringency model, the time
variable continues to be significant. The size of the coefficient for the squared variable is
the same (-0.02). The fixed effect approach results in a significant coefficient for the
performance proxy at the 10% level, with a coefficient of -3.178. The percentage of
Republicans in the legislature continues to be significant under the fixed effect, with a
coefficient of 4.37.
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Regression Diagnostics
Diagnostic tests were performed for the main regression model. Use of the
principal component approach and the additive index yielded the same results—in terms
of significance and coefficient—so diagnostics were only run for the model with PCF.
When performing a multiple regression, we want the estimators to be BLUE: Best Linear
Unbiased Estimators. In order for the estimators to be BLUE, we have to verify that the
assumptions of OLS hold. Multiple regression assumes a linear relationship between the
variables. To examine this assumption, one method is to plot the standardized residuals of
the regression against each independent variable. The graphs have been included under
Appendix 2. There is no clear pattern, except that there are more negative residuals
observed for higher values of the number of years the PBF model is present. For the
degrees/enrollment variable, the residuals are nearly 0. I did not find any “bowed”
pattern, which would indicate that the model made systematic errors.
While normality is not required for the estimates to be BLUE, it is important to
test for normality to validate the t- and p-values. Using the kernel density plot of
residuals, we see significant deviation from the theoretical normal one distribution (refer
to Appendix 3 for the plots). The normal probability plot reveals sensitivity to nonnormality in several sections of the data. Normality issues are also observed in the
normal quantile plot, particularly in the middle section of the graph. The
skewness/kurtosis test for normality in the model had a Prob>chi2 = 0.00 indicating there
was an issue because it was less than 0.05 and the null hypothesis is rejected. To further
explore the normality of the residuals, a Shapiro-Wilk W test was conducted. This test
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confirmed that there is a normality issue with the residuals in the model, because the
Prob>z =0.
For all tests, there seemed to be issues of normality. There are different ways to
deal with normality, such as transformation of central variables. Because of the normality
issues that were found, the present results should be used with caution. The normality
assumption states that we are as likely to overestimate regression scores as we are to
underestimate them. If this assumption is violated, the confidence intervals may be too
wide or too narrow.
Researchers at the Duke University Fuqua School of Business have suggested that
“technically, the normal distribution assumption is not necessary if you are willing to
assume the model equation is correct and your only goal is to estimate its coefficients and
generate predictions in such a way as to minimize mean squared error” (n.d., Violations
of normality section, paragraph 2). We must therefore, use the estimates from the model
with caution, with the understanding that a significant violation of the normal distribution
(as seems to be present in this model) suggests that there may be a bigger problem with
the data or simply that there is a more appropriate model that better explains the
relationship between the variables. In addition, Kroll (2015) suggested that the normality
assumption can be relaxed if n=100, or if n=500. In this case, the sample was 532
observations. Therefore, we could relax this assumption.
The homoscedasticity test in both models, using the residual plotting tool in Stata,
revealed that as the PFUI increase, the positive residuals systematically decrease, and
negative residuals decrease. Using Cameron & Trivedi’s (1990) test, we obtain a p-value
of 0.000 and, therefore, reject the null. To confirm whether these results are accurate, I
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conducted the Bresch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. The prob>chi2 = 0.000, and we
therefore reject the null, indicating an issue. To make sure the results address this
discrepancy, the regressions were run by using robust standard errors, which will make
the significance tests more conservative.
The last test performed aimed at identifying outliers, which may affect regression
results. As some of the independent variables increase, the dependent variable stays
constant. This is the case for states with no performance funding in place. Finally, I tested
for multicollinearity. Both models of adoption and stringency do not have any issues. The
average value obtained was 2.25 and 3.34, respectively.
Findings and Discussion
I estimated the adoption model with logit regression by calculating the effects of
each independent variable on the probability of adoption of a performance-based system,
while holding the other independent variables constant. It was hypothesized that
performance flows and conservative ideology predicted adoption, because low
performance requires action and political ideology affects how politicians respond (for
example, Republicans are likely to select into PBF practices).
The coefficient of the performance variable is indeed negative and significant at
the 1% level. As suggested in the performance literature, the improvement of
performance is a vital goal of a performance system (Rabovsky, 2012). Thus, the present
data supports the hypothesis that deficits in achievements, as defined by the entity’s goals
and mission, will result in the adoption of a performance system. Future research should
consider another unit of analysis, other than the state.
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As demonstrated by prior research, a state is more likely to adopt policies that are
skeptical of bureaucracy when more Republicans are elected to the state legislature
(McLendon et al., 2006). The presumption under the adoption of a performance system is
that there is a need for improvement. Thus, elected officials will be likely to implement
performance systems to hold the bureaucracy accountable. The present data support our
hypothesis that a conservative political ideology is associated with adoption of a
performance system, which is aligns with the existing literature. My findings suggest that
having a Republican Governor and a higher proportion of Republicans in the legislature
increase the likelihood of adoption of performance-based budgeting.
The classic theory of diffusion (Walker, 1969) did not fully explained the
adoption of a performance system. The negative coefficient suggests an inverse
relationship and fails to achieve statistical significance at the conventional levels.
The stringency model was estimated using an OLS regression, calculating the
effect of each independent variable on the PFUI, while holding other independent
variables constant. Here, neither the coefficient of the performance variable, nor one of
the variables operationalizing political conservatism (having a Republican Governor),
were returned as significant. The proportion of Republican legislature is significant and
suggests that it is associated with a more stringent system. This finding suggests that
performance and political ideology influence adoption but may not be helpful in
explaining stringency: they force states to act (e.g., adopt a new policy) but provide little
direction regarding the particular configuration of the implemented PBF system. As in
the adoption model, the diffusion variable has not been significant here, either.
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A limitation of the stringency model is that the dependent variable is only five
dimensions: benchmarking, percentage, impact to base, complexity, and penalty. It is
possible that not all aspects of a PBF are captured by the index. Certain factors are
difficult to measure and can only be captured through other methods of data collection,
such as interviews, case studies, etc. Future research should consider use of qualitative
research techniques.
The most significant finding from this analysis is the importance of time. The
variable that captures the years of operation for the performance system is consistently
significant at the 1% level. All model iterations returned similar results. The findings can
be interpreted as follows: for every additional year the PBF is in place, stringency is
expected to increase by 0.76 points. Figure 6 presents an increasingly stringent system
over time. The squared term for time was included in the model to evaluate the nonlinear
effect of time. The estimators from the analysis are significant. The findings reveal that
the stringency reaches a certain plateau, after which it begins to decrease. This finding is
novel and constitutes a contribution to the literature. Prior research has mainly addressed
this issue from a principal-agent perspective (Heinrich & Marschke, 2010). The data
show that the learning curve initially increases the stringency of the performance model,
but then it reaches a tipping point. A plausible explanation is that policymakers become
less excited about the PMS model or because their attention is diverted to a more salient
issue. A possible explanation is that we may see different generations of PBF systems:
early-stage adopters experimented with a soft version of PBF; whereas middle-stage
states adopted stricter NPM-style systems. The late-stage adopters do less (perhaps due to
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NPM fatigue). Determining the reasons for this diminishing trend is an important
research question for the future.
From these findings, I can deduct that the configuration of the PBF system (i.e.,
its stringency) changes over time as a result of state learning through use. A plausible
explanation is that experience seems more important than original motivation. Systems
may become more stringent at first (to address strategic behavior and system errors), but
will eventually stagnate. This means that they rarely reach the maximum stringency level:
either because state politicians become disillusioned about the performance system and
its return on investments, or they are satisfied with the results.
Limitations and Future Research
Future research might consider the characteristics related to the bureaucracy, such
as average number of years in service or level of education of the bureaucracy. This will
provide further insight into the factors that affect the performance of the system,
including if—and how—performance relates to elected officials’ behavior. In addition, a
future research avenue should consider units of analysis other than the state. There were
not many suitable options to choose from for higher education performance proxy, which
would describe the performance at the state level. Also, the proxy used here, the average
U.S. News Ranking, is based on a self -reported survey, which presents issues related to
face validity.
In addition, other venues might consider further exploring the effect of time to
determine the reasons for stagnation. One aspect to consider is whether the states are
satisfied with the system. In other words, were performance systems able to deliver on
their promises to improve performance?
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In terms of the diffusion hypothesis, a future analysis should consider grouping
states based on factors other than geographical proximity. As alternatives to this
grouping, states may be eliminated from the analysis, based on commonalities such as
total state budgets, demographics, fiscal state, or political composition. In addition, policy
diffusion could be studied in the context of the role of conservative organizations, such as
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and think tanks. Lastly, the present
study explored only two internal factors: organization’s performance and the political
ideology. There are many other interesting internal factors to consider, such as the fiscal
stress and a revenue diversification index.
A limitation worth highlighting is that the sample is specific to R1 institutions of
higher education. In terms of generalizing the results to the broader public sector, other
factors (e.g., relevant control variables) might also play a role in the decision-making
process of a sector. In addition, future research may consider expanding the panel data set
to include the years 2015-2018 in order to analyze more years where a performance
system was in place and to further explore the effect of time.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the factors that determine the
adoption of a performance-based system and its stringency, and whether both were
influenced by the same factors. I hypothesized that underperformance, conservative
political ideology, and regional diffusion were precursors of adoption and that they were
positively associated with a more stringent system. The analysis shows that adoption and
stringency are not explained by the same factors. While adoption is positively associated
with conservative political ideology and underperformance, it is not affected by diffusion.
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Stringency is not significantly associated with either the ideology of the governor or
diffusion—only with the Republican legislature. An interesting finding is that PBF
systems do not naturally become more stringent over time. Rather, they stop changing at
some point, and remain constant or even decrease in stringency.
These results indicate that state legislatures dominated by politically conservative
elected officials are more likely to adopt a performance system than legislatures
dominated by politically liberal elected officials. In addition, the states whose education
systems performed poorly are more likely to adopt a performance system. The findings
provide support to states and other governments—motivated by lack of performance—
that are considering adopting a performance system.
The development of the stringency index, the PFUI, is an important contribution
to the literature. It furthers our understanding of the factors that affect a performance
system configuration. It also provides guidance to policymakers with respect to the life of
a performance system and the evolution of its stringency.
An important theoretical contribution is the link between the stringency level and
time. Performance systems are largely based on the premise that they will be in-place as a
long-term policy mechanism. However, the findings reveal that systems are not always
adopted with the same level of stringency. The point at which a state decides to join
others in policy adoption affects the performance system. In the beginning of the
adoption period, during the first wave of adoptions, the systems are softer, but follow an
increasing trend toward greater stringency. The trend results in an increasingly more
stringent system for those who decide to implement the new PMS in the middle stage.
After reaching a tipping point, the systems then follow a decreasingly stringent trend.
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Therefore, states that adopt performance systems long after the first wave of adoptions
implement comparatively less stringent systems.
CHAPTER 4
The Impact of Performance-based Funding in Higher Education
Universities have an array of goals that are diverse and, at times, not easily
quantified; thus, it is often difficult to use performance-based accountability policies in
higher education (Rabovsky, 2014a). A small group of experts have advocated for a shift
from quantifying the output to considering the outcomes (Van Dooren, 2011) so that
important aspects that directly impact society are counted. In higher education, a
dimension that has been neglected in PBF is the mission of the institution—primarily
because it is difficult to measure. The Carnegie classification system is utilized to classify
institutions based on their mission (O’Meara, 2007). The mission of a research university
is different from a teaching institution. The level of support and access to funds will
significantly vary (Rabovsky, 2014b) from one institution to another. For example, the
mission of one is to foster research and development, while the mission of another might
be to nurture teaching. In general, PBF models do not capture this aspect in their
formulas because they only use key performance indicators (KPIs). KPIs only measure
quantifiable indicators; however, a host of other services provided in higher education
institutions are unmeasurable (Van Dooren, 2011). The systematic way in which PBF in
higher education connects performance information and budget allocations is rare and
can pose a threat to the fundamental values of educational institutions (Bischoof &
Blaechke, 2015).

102

In the previous chapter, I developed an index based on five dimensions that were
identified as common traits of PBF: benchmarking, methodology used to award funds,
the impact to the base budget from year-to-year, the complexity of the model and, lastly,
the extent to which states may impose penalties for underperformance. Table 7 presents a
brief overview of the dimensions. For the second dimension, funding methodology, most
states allocate 5% to 10% of total state support based on performance (National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2016. The third dimension, impact to base, examines
the impact to the institution’s base budget. The practice of providing a one-time bonus
above the base budget (sub-category “a”) is considered to be more traditional and is often
classified to be the PBF 1.0 Wave; whereas the more contemporary and sophisticated
practice of embedding the PBF funds as part of the base (sub-category “b”) is deemed
PBF 2.0 (Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones & Vega, 2013).
The fourth dimension, which is based on the total number of key performance
indicators (KPIs), captures the most important aspects of the PBF. KPIs are used to
measure the university’s performance. The number of KPIs ranges widely and may even
change from year-to-year, depending on the priorities of the governors and legislatures.
KPIs in higher education tend to focus on student success measures. The most utilized
KPIs are graduation rates, followed by retention, year-to-year retention rates, total
degrees awarded, student outcomes for minority or low-income students, and number of
degrees produced (Rabovsky, 2012; Li, 2014).
PBF adoption varies across states. Each state typically establishes its own set of
indicators to determine each institution’s eligibility for performance funding. In general,
PBF systems aim to improve outputs (e.g., student retention and graduation rates, as well
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as other student performance indicators). While institutions attempt to meet performance
standards, their actions might result in changes in institutional behaviors, system gaming,
and lowering admissions of students with lower socio-economic backgrounds.
As presented in Chapter 2, the literature on the impact of PMS is mixed. Most of
the evidence leans toward negative, unintended, or no impact at all. For this reason, more
research is needed to understand the extent to which PMS models achieve the objectives
they set out to fulfill after the model is established. It is also important to understand
unintended consequences associated with the system’s adoption.
Hypotheses on the Impact of Performance-based Funding
While there are increased efforts to establish PBF models in higher education
across the United States, they often face disapproval. PBF is a policy instrument that is
not exempt from potential policy design and implementation problems (Birdsall, 2018).
The inability to account for the multifaceted capacities, resources, and missions of target
organizations (Heinrich, 1999; Radin, 2006) are some design related issues that have
been found in previous research. The way in which PBF has been implemented in higher
education creates unique challenges because it establishes “tight, automatic and
formulaic” relationships between funding and performance indicators (Burke &
Minassians, 2003, p. 3). These challenges leave no room to accommodate special
circumstances, such as a student’s socio-economic background or the mission of the
institution.
Some unintended consequences that have been linked to PBF adoption are: costs
of fulfilment, tightening of institutional missions, control of student admissions, grade
inflation, and diminished academic standards management disapproval, and negative
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impact to vulnerable groups (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Patrick & Rollins, 2015).
Additionally, opponents of the performance-based funding model are concerned that it
will adversely influence academic excellence and rigor, and that the efforts to advance
diversity and access will be weakened (Huisman & Currie, 2004). Adoption of PBF has
potential consequences, including lower student performance (Andersen, 2008) and
gaming behavior following implementation (Gerrish, 2016). In addition, PBF may
distract management from other important issues and introduce incentives for attaining
performance goals (Birdsall, 2018). The unintended impacts of PBF adoption in higher
education are important to consider because PBF may inadvertently provoke a shift away
from democratic ideals for higher education institutions, such as broad and equitable
access (Dougherty & Natow, 2019), which were once top priorities of public universities.
Because of the heightened focus on the negative implications following PBF adoption,
the following hypothesis will be explored:
H1: The adoption of a performance-based system will negatively impact certain
mission-based results.
In general, the overall results of the research regarding the effectiveness of a PBF
model have been mixed (e.g., Berman & Wang, 2000; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005; Sun
& Ryzin, 2014). In addition to the literature that highlights the negative aspects of PBF,
another stream of research has shown that PBF does lead to better performance. After all,
performance management systems aim: to enhance effectiveness, efficiency,
accountability, and quality in the provision of public goods and services (Birdsall, 2018).
When used effectively, performance management systems may result in agencies
reevaluating essential principles of their missions, or to make fundamental changes to the
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way the organization functions (Rabovsky, 2014a; Monhiyan, 2005). An effective
performance management system will help public managers run their organizations
effectively (Angiola & Bianchi, 2015).
In the case of higher education, increased instructional expenditures have been
shown to be closely linked to the adoption of PBF (Rabovsky, 2012). Evidence regarding
advancement of student and academic success has been linked to the administrative
changes implemented by institutions following the adoption of a PBF model (Dougherty
& Reddy, 2011). In the context of public education, No Child Left Behind advanced
stronger accountability for student performance (Heinrich, 2010). Hong (2018) found
evidence that organizational changes are in fact driven by performance management
systems and that failure to meet performance standards results in adjustments that will
drive performance improvement. The adoption of PBF in higher education institutions is
typically preceded by support from university personnel, who often trust that the adoption
of a performance-based funding may improve outcomes (Dougherty & Reddy, 2019).
The second hypothesis will explore whether a performance-based system results in
enhanced effectiveness in terms of outcomes.
H2: A performance-based system will result in better results.
The literature on PBF effectiveness is mixed. In addition to the negative and
positive results discussed in Chapter 2, prior studies have not found a strong link between
a performance management system and performance outcomes (Barnow, 2000; Patrick &
Rollins, 2015; Sanger, 2013). This is concerning due to the high emphasis on adoption of
a PMS, yet the systems do not seem to deliver on their promises of improved
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performance (Li & Kennedy, 2018). A particular concern is that the PMS may be failing
because performance information from the system is not being utilized (Moynihan,
2008b). The use of performance information data is a distinct area of research in the
performance management literature (e.g., Bischoff & Blaeschke, 2016; DimitrijevskaMarkoski & French, 2019; Gerrish, 2016; Kroll, 2017; Moynihan, 2006). The non-use of
performance information is, at times, deliberate; managers sometimes use other informal
mechanisms to track performance (Angiola & Banchi, 2015), such as talking to
colleagues, customers, and other people instead of sophisticated performance reports
(Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008). When performance information is not used, one
might argue that the performance management has a null effect because it is not being
utilized to make the decisions that will influence the organization.
Outcomes such as improved instruction, higher graduation rates, and enhanced
faculty research productivity have been shown to be weakly related to PBF adoption
(Dougerty & Natow, 2019). In the context of a large urban school district, it was found
that performance management did not lead to improved performance on its own (Destler,
2016; Heinrich, 2002). Research has also shown no meaningful methodical enhancements
in college completion rates (Hillman, Tandberg, & Gross, 2014). Bischoff and Blaeschke
(2016) found that PBF results in substantial social waste from its use, PBF is often as a
symbolic tool. Gerrish (2016b) found that performance information alone cannot be
attributed to the improvement of performance, and that other factors must be introduced.
Ho (2011) found little connection between budget appropriations and performance
indicators. For this reason, it is hypothesized that a PBF is not associated with neither
better nor worse results; that is, the impact is null.
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H3: A performance-based system will result in no difference in results.
Institutions of higher education have diverse and complex missions and goals.
Some are easier to measure than others (time-to-graduation and retention rates), while
some measures (personal growth and development, overall contributions to culture,
knowledge, and diversity) are much more difficult to quantify (Rabovsky, 2014a). This
relevant area of research should be studied closely. Otherwise, we might be missing an
opportunity to cultivate the values that our public institutions were intended to foster. In
addition, we might be ignoring less quantifiable impacts that public institutions exert
within and beyond their communities.
Research Design
Estimation Strategy
A panel dataset for the years 2000 through 2015, using data from the U.S.
Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS), was
constructed. The goal was to compare the university performance when it was subject to
a performance-based-funding policy to the counterfactual—that is, to a university where
performance-based funding is not used. A major concern was that universities that use
performance-based-funding policies substantially differ from those that do not, and that
these differences may be correlated with performance. For example, PBF may have been
implemented in universities with students from high socioeconomic backgrounds. In this
case, using a simple cross-section comparison would produce bias, as the correlation
between PBF and performance would be confounded by the unobserved effects of
families with high socioeconomic status helping their children to perform well. To
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address this problem, a longitudinal approach is used, which considers time-invariant
unobserved variables.
The gradual adoption of PBF among universities allows the use of a before and
after difference-in-differences estimation. I used diverse sources (e.g., the National
Conference of State Legislatures, state legislatures, budget documents) to identify the
“adopter” universities and the “non-adopters.” The adopter and non-adopter universities
were identified based on whether or not the state had adopted a PBF policy during the
period of 2000-2015. In the case where states had adopted a PBF before 2000, a group of
adopters were classified as pre-adopters before the period of this study. In addition, six
states had adopted a PBF, but later became non-adopters. This group of states was
excluded from the analysis. The following model was estimated:
yict = α + 1(treat) + 2(post) + 3(treat X post) + i + t + mc + controlsit + it
where yict is the outcome variable of university i(i=1, 2,…, N) in year t (t=2000,
2001,…2015) and part of cohort c (c=Pre-2000, 2000, 2001…2015). The treatment
vector 1(treat) is a dichotomous variable used to denote universities affected by PBF. It
takes the value of 0 prior to PBF adoption and .1 after adoption. The variable 2(post) is a
binary indicator that equals 1 for institutions when PBF takes place. 3 is the differencein-differences (DID) estimator, which measures the impact of PBF on treated institutions.
The DID estimator is utilized to estimate the effect of a program policy. It is a difference
estimator between the actual outcome variable that would occur in the post treatment
period for the treatment group had there been no treatment.
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Year fixed-effects i controls for hypothetical year-specific events that may impact
the outcome variable for all universities. For example, these could include national-level
policy fluctuations or unpredictable fiscal events. University fixed-effects i are used to
consider unobserved variables at the university level that might confound the effect of
using PBF, such as quality of education, quality of the faculty, and mission. These fixed
effects helped me account for omitted variable bias, thus improving our model’s internal
validity, so that I could more closely arrive at causal inference between the policy and the
observed outcomes. In addition, my model accounted for cohort adoption dummies mc
that index the different sets of universities treated by the PBF (e.g., different universities
might be affected by PBF at different points in time). Universities affected at one point in
time therefore become a “cohort.” Although the difference-in-differences model includes
year and university fixed effects, the model also controls for key variables of the
university and the state because of potential year-to-year volatility in university
characteristics. As the university level, I included the total undergraduate enrollment by
institution, and the institution’s reputation, among other elements. At the state level, I
accounted for the total population poverty rate, total state appropriations, etc.
As a result of the hierarchical structure with students, the errors might be
correlated within universities. For example, unobserved university variables such as
administration quality or faculty quality could include correlation in the errors within
universities. To account for this clustering by universities, I used cluster standard errors
at the university level with the Stata command VCE. The VCE command stipulates how
to estimate the variance–covariance matrix (VCE) corresponding to the parameter
estimates, which in this case is the universities (StataCorp, 2013).

110

The analysis was based on all public 4-year, doctoral-degree granting universities
classified as Carnegie-Highest-Research activity in the U.S, which returned a sample of
82 institutions. The unit of analysis is the university. Universities were coded by cohort,
based on adoption year. In each cohort, adopters for that year were compared to the states
that never adopted. Thus, there are multiple entries for never-adopters—because they
served as the control group for each adoption cohort. To assess a performance-based
system’s impact on the outcome variables (racial/ethnic minority enrollment, graduation
rate, and racial/ethnic minority graduation rate), an ordinary least-squares regression was
implemented using the DID technique.
DID is a quasi-experimental tool often used to evaluate the result of a specific
change in financial setting or government policy, in combination with a natural
experiment in which nature does the randomization (Roberts, 2016). The main
assumption underlying the difference-in-differences design is that, in the absence of a
PBF intervention, the average change in university performance would have been the
same for adopter universities and non-adopter universities. If PBF did enhance
performance, universities subject to the policy (i.e., the treatment group) would be
expected to produce significantly better performance after the PBF was adopted—as
compared with performance before adoption when the treatment was not in place. It is
not possible to observe the counter factual (i.e., performance changes at universities
subject to the PBF had the PBF not been adopted) (Roberts, 2016). To analyze the policy
impact, I compared variations in the outcome within treatment and control groups before
and after the PBF. This comparison offered an unbiased estimate of the policy’s effect
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because the control group of universities were never subject to the PBF, yet they were
exposed to the same unobserved yearly state-level time trends (Li & Kennedy, 2018).
A key assumption of DID is a parallel trend, which means that average changes in
the control and experimental groups would be the same in the absence of treatment
(Wang & Yeung, 2018). To test this assumption, more than one period of data prior to the
treatment was needed. I was able to test it based on the cohort years, which accounts for
the different adoption years. For example, for a university member of Cohort 14 where
PBF was adopted in the year 2012, the panel data includes data before the treatment
occurred (i.e., 2000-2012). The control group for this cohort would be, for example,
Cohort 15 (adopted in the year 2013). The idea underlying the cohort grouping is that
each group controls for each other, which allowed me to follow the parallel trends during
non-treatment years. Figures 7, 8, and 9 show a graphical representation of the parallel
trends for each of the dependent variables within our study. As shown in the figures, the
control and experimental groups demonstrated nearly parallel trends before the adoption
year.
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Figure 7. Parallel Trends Minority Enrollment

Figure 8. Parallel Trends Graduation Rate within 150%
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Figure 9. Parallel Trends Hispanic And African American Graduation Rate

Data and Measures
I built a university-level panel dataset from 2000-2015, during which the waves of
PBF adoptions for universities occurred. I operationalized the policy treatment as the
presence of a state performance-based funding policy for state universities, inclusive of
the adoption year. The states that had performance-based funding in the dataset enacted
legislation by which some or all of the appropriations to state universities were based on
performance as measured by KPIs. Several sources were used to determine the exact
years during which a state operated under a performance-based-funding mechanism.
For each university that operated under such a performance-based funding policy,
I coded a dummy variable as 1 during the adoption year and for each year thereafter. I
considered the policy to have potential impacts beginning in the year that the legislation
was scheduled to take effect. For example, if a policy was enacted in 2005 but scheduled
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to take effect in 2006, it was coded as 1 beginning in 2006. The policy dummy variable
that I created was equal to 1 only when the state actually adopted the policy. In the case
of states that adopted but later dropped out, they were coded as 0 when the PBF was
discontinued. Figure 5 illustrates the states coded as 1 during the year 2015. Universities
in the data set were defined in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) as being public, 4-year institutions, and designated as Carnegie Classification
Very High Research Universities. This returned a total of 82 institutions in 40 states.
The panel data set also has information regarding the universities. IPEDS offers
university-level data on admissions, completions, enrollment, graduation rates,
enrollment, financial aid, and finances. In addition, information regarding state
appropriations and other financial information was obtained from the website of the
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Other sources included the U.S.
News World Report ranking, the State of Higher Education Finance (SHEF), the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the U.S. Census Bureau.
This study models three outcome variables. They include racial/ethnic minority
enrollment, overall graduation rate, and racial/ethnic minority graduation rate.
Racial/ethnic minority enrollment is defined as the ratio of total enrollment of students
that identify as American Indian or Alaskan, Black or African American, Hispanic and or
Asian/Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander over the total enrollment by institution,
regardless of ethnicity. The 150% graduation rate measure was used for the overall
graduation rate, which was calculated as the total number of completers within 150% of
normal time divided by the adjusted cohort size. Racial/ethnic minority graduation is a
measure calculated by dividing the total racial/ethnic minority graduates over the total
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number of graduates within 150% of normal time. Graduation rates and enrollment have
previously been used to study the impact of PBF (Birdsall, 2018; Hillman, 2014;
Rabovsky, 2012; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2014; Tandberg & Hillman, 2014; McKinney
& Hagedon, 2015). Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics, as well as the correlation
among all variables.
I selected these variables because they capture the unintended consequences that
are associated with PBF adoption. In the case of public education in the United States,
educational opportunity is as important as educational attainment—where opportunity
encompasses issues such as justice, fairness, and an equal chance for students and their
families (Frederickson, 2010). However, educational opportunities and attainment could
present conflicting goals. For instance, providing opportunities to all students, regardless
of their likelihood of success, could lead to lower rates of attainment. Potential factors
that affect students’ abilities to perform well are ethnicity, unequal access to key
educational resources (e.g., skilled teachers), and quality curriculum and income levels
(Darling-Hammond, 2007). In other words, the combination of factors linked to students’
social backgrounds could have a significant negative impact on their academic
performance. For these reasons, I chose racial/ethnic minority enrollment and graduation
rates of Hispanic and African-American students as proxies to measure unintended
consequences. The rationale is that the emphasis on student success metrics (e.g.,
graduation, retention, and employment) may negatively impact the enrollment of certain
populations, which have been previously shown to negatively affect students’ abilities to
succeed.
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To better segregate the effects of PBF, I included a series of time-varying
university and state level variables from IPEDS and other sources. A number of variables
that have previously been verified or used in other studies were included, such as
enrollment intensity of students. This measures the percentage of part-time students
among the overall student headcount (Hillman et al., 2015). Racial divide was also
included as an independent variable of interest. This accounts for the factor of race; it has
been previously demonstrated that racial minorities tend to perform lower than their
White counterparts in education (Woodridge & Gooden, 2014). Control variables were
used for the analysis: total undergraduate enrollment, the performance of the University
as measured by the U.S. News Ranking system, enrollment intensity, poverty rate,
unemployment rate, total state appropriations, tuition, and fee revenues, as well as total
revenues. The use of these variables aligns with prior studies that analyze performancebased mechanisms (Birdsall, 2018; Hillman et al., 2015). The appendix includes
additional information regarding the measures and their sources.
Results
Table 13 presents the parameter estimates from the model formalized in this
paper. Results are presented for the models of the three outcome variables of interest:
racial/ethnic minority enrollment, graduation rate for all, and graduation rate for racialethnic minorities. On average, none of the three outcomes exhibited significant changes
in response to performance-based funding. Had universities not been subject to PBF, they
would have performed at the same level as the other institutions in terms of racial/ethnic
minority enrollment, graduation rate for all students, and graduation rate for racial/ethnic
minorities. The overall graduation rate coefficient (model 2B) shows some significance at
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the 10% level, but the effect is very small, nearly 0. Therefore, is a small positive
association between adopting a PBF and the increase of graduation rates for all students.
These models did not include six states that adopted a PBF model but that later
discontinued use of PBF. The effects including these states are comparable. The results
are not surprising.
These findings contribute to the mixed body of literature regarding the effect of
PBF systems (Gerrish, 2016; Kroll, 2017; Moynihan & Pandey, 2016). However, the
results seem to align more closely with research that argues that performance-based
funding policies produce no results (Destler, 2016; Heinrich, 2002).
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Table 12. Descriptive Statistics, Impact Model
Name

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1

1. Racial-Ethnic
Minority
Enrollment

2

3

4

5

6

7,526

0.343

0.200

0.07

0.98

1.000

2. Graduation
Rate 150%

7,334

0.669

0.147

0.27

0.95

0.206

1.000

3. Minority
Graduation Rate
150%

7,334

0.082

0.510

0.01

0.46

0.639

0.230

1.000

4. Treat

7,648

0.035

0.184

0

1

-0.112

-0.010

-0.05

1.000

5. Post

7,648

0.542

0.498

0

1

0.027

0.103

0.085

0.170

1.000

6. UG Enrollment 7,588

21433

7495

8

59382

0.0618

0.202

0.192

0.101

0.077

1.000

7. US News
Average

7,456

3.064

0.366

2.2

3.9

0.182

0.426

-0.007

-0.092

-0.047

-0.171

1.000

8. Racial Divide

7,588

0.574

0.226

0

0.91

-0.807

-0.273

-0.550

0.101

-0.068

-0.019

-0.270

1.000

9. Enrollment
Intensity

7,588

0.133

0.125

0.02

1

-0.002

-0.750

-0.048

0.030

-0.064

0.053

-0.461

0.099

1.000

10. Poverty Rate

7,648

13.66

2.898

5.7

23.1

0.284

-0.174

0.285

-0.051

0.062

0.063

-0.483

-0.158

0.194

1.000

11.
Unemployment
Rate

7,456

6.282

2.023

2.2

13.09

0.386

0.242

0.072

-0.050

0.018

-0.010

0.133

-0.372

-0.186

0.389

1.000

12. State
Appropriations

6,443

2.68^8

1.31^

0

7.02^8

0.035

0.651

0.072

-0.061

0.018

0.330

0.152

-0.103

-0.434

-0.103

0.154

1.000

13. Tuition and
Fees

6,443

2.24^8

1.39^8

1.13^7

0.141

0.537

0.207

0.148

0.250

0.609

0.085

-0.203

-0.265

0.016

0.180

0.357

1.000

14. All Revenues

6,443

1.46^9

1.09^9

1.08^8

0.203

0.659

0.158

0.013

0.119

0.409

0.287

-0.254

-0.379

-0.017

0.2162

0.629

0.751

1.000

15. Proportion of
State App over
All Revenues

6,443

.240

0.113

0

0.77

-0.252

-0.346

-0.161

-0.109

-0.177

-0.288

-0.184

0.217

0.133

-0.102

-0.168

-0.009

-0.608

-0.650

1.000

16. Population

7,636

16/15

1.065

13.56

17.48

0.771

0.233

0.661

-0.124

0.016

0.118

0.095

-0.647

-0.053

0.442

0.307

0.042

0.084

0.136

-0.118 1.000
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Table 13. Regression Results, Impact Model
RACIAL/ETHNIC
MINORITY
ENROLLMENT
(1a)
(1b)
-0.02
-0.00
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
0.00
(0.00
(0.00)
0.01
0.14*
(0.04)
(0.06)

GRADUATION
RATE | ALL
150%
(2a)
(2b)
-0.00
0.02^
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.00^
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.00
-0.00*
(0.00
(0.00)
-0.01
0.04
(0.03)
(0.03)

Racial Divide

-0.40**
(0.08)

0.04
(0.03)

0.03
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.01)

Enrollment
Intensity

0.37**
(0.11)

-0.07
(0.06)

-0.06
(0.13)

Poverty Rate

-0.00
(0.01)

-0.00^
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00

-0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00*
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)

-0.75
(0.11)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
-0.00*
(0.00)

-0.00
(0.00)
0.00**
(0.00)
0.00^
(0.00)
-0.00^
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)

-0.31^
(0.16)

-0.01
(0.09)

0.41**
(0.13)

0.04
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.09)

0.00
(0.03)

0.10**
(0.01)
Yes

0.56*
(0.11)
Yes

0.04**
(0.01)
Yes

0.09
(0.06)
Yes

0.02**
(0.00)
Yes

0.25**
(0.04)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

-1.00**
(0.27)

-9.19**
(1.82)

0.20
(0.16)

-0.91
(0.92)

-0.15
(0.10)

-4.15**
(0.63)

6,009

6,009

5,927

5,927

5,927

5,927

IMPACT

Treat x Post
Post
UG Enrollment
US News Average

Unemployment
Rate
State
Appropriations
Tuition and Fees
All Revenues
Proportion of State
App over All
Revenues
Population
Year Fixed Effects
University Fixed
Effects
Adoption Cohort
Dummies
Cons
N
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GRADUATION
RATE |
MINORITY 150%
(3a)
(3b)
0.00
0.00
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.00
0.00
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.00
0.00
(0.00
(0.00)
-0.03^
0.06^
(0.01)
(0.04)
-0.03*
0.09**
(0.01)
(0.03)
-0.05
-0.00
(0.05)
(0.07)

IMPACT
Within R-Sq

RACIAL/ETHNIC
MINORITY
ENROLLMENT
(1a)
(1b)
0.817
0.775

GRADUATION
RATE | ALL
150%
(2a)
(2b)
0,836
0.688

GRADUATION
RATE |
MINORITY 150%
(3a)
(3b)
0.631
0.612

^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01. The analysis is based on a 15-year panel data set including 82 R1
universities from 39 states. Standard errors were clustered at the university-level in all models.

Limitations and Future Research
These estimations indicate no significant average policy effects; however, it is
possible that the models are omitting consequences by assuming that there is a uniform
effect from the PMS for each year the policy has functioned. The null policy effects
found might be attributed to lagged reactions to the policy that appear in the years after
initial adoption (Li & Kennedy, 2018). Future avenues of research should consider
accounting for this lag.
My model has some basic assumptions. For example, I assume that the tendencies
would have been the same for adopter universities and non-adopter universities in the
absence of the PBF. In addition, I expect that these tendencies would be violated if
group-specific interventions that also affect performance occur (Hvidman & Andersen,
2013). Specifically, the model would be violated if more interventions, aside from PBF,
were introduced at adopter universities than at non-adopter universities during the period
of 2000-2015, particularly if these interventions also affect performance. For example,
during this period, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was
enacted. The ARRA provided an opportunity for states to use this one-time federal
investment to incentivize their performance, such as degree production (The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009). Examining this aspect would have
strengthened the present study; it is an avenue for future research.
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Future research might consider an in-depth exploration of the relationship
between the independent variables that are statistically significant in this model. These
variables could include the U.S. News Average, a proxy of the institution’s performance,
the racial divide, enrollment intensity, and the proportion of state appropriations over
total revenue. In addition, further research is needed to account for other actions
occurring at the campus level that lead to enhanced performance. The fact that
universities adopted a PBF system at different times addresses variable overlap.
However, I suggest future investigations on the impact of other policy interventions to
better isolate the effect of PBF policies. Lastly, considerations regarding the lag effect
should be incorporated into a future study.
Another limitation is that this sample is specific to R1 institutions of higher
education. In terms of generalizing the results to the broader public sector, one should be
cautious about considering factors that might also play a role in the decision-making
process of the sector such as relevant control variables. In addition, future research may
consider expanding the panel data set to include the years 2015-2020; more years of
performance system data will help researchers further explore the effect of time.
Despite these limitations, the study provides further evidence that PBF systems
result in window dressing, or simply a symbol to denote that something is being done.
That is, the systems remain somewhat controversial: the general public is made to believe
that policy makers care about higher education; however, there is little evidence of
tracking to ensure that systems yield the promised results.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this analysis expands the literature on performance management
systems by studying an essential area of government: higher education. Specifically, the
study is helpful because there is a limited number of quantitative, empirical studies in this
area. Only 59 were found. The study of the performance-based funding policies is
important due to the increased adoption of these types of policies, not only in higher
education, but in the overall public sector. Higher education is significant because of the
role universities and colleges have in the overall development of society. The findings are
concerning because they provide further evidence that there might be too much ado about
nothing and that, in fact, these policies might be used as smoke and mirrors and not truly
with the intent to exert change.
In this study, I address the research question on whether PBF models impact
racial/ethnic minority enrollment, graduation rates for all students, and graduation rates
for racial/ethnic minority students at R1 state universities. As a whole, the results suggest
that performance-based funding is not generally associated with changes in racial/ethnic
minority enrollment, graduation rates, or graduation rates for racial/ethnic minorities. The
findings suggest that performance-based funding models do not produce significant
results on their own. Universities were hypothesized to experience positive performances
after the introduction of a PBF. However, I found little support for this—in only one of
the models. I also hypothesized that the universities would experience negative results
from the PBFs, and found no support. Lastly, it was hypothesized that there was no
effect. In other words, the adoption of a PBF did not produce enhanced performance or
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unintended consequences (negative or positive). There is overwhelming support for this
last hypothesis based on the results.
William Bruce Cameron said “not everything that counts can be counted, and not
everything that can be counted counts” (Cullis, 2017). PBF, like other performance
management policies inspired by NPM principles, emphasizes the measurement of
performance. In the case of higher education, several meaningful dimensions are not
properly measured and, when counted, are not counted in a meaningful way. The results
from this research led me to ask the following questions: Are we truly counting what
should be counted? Perhaps what is being counted does not count? Are we leaving out
what we should be counting? More importantly, how do we account for what should be
counted, or should we stop counting altogether? Have we lost sight of what truly counts
by counting what is easy to count? Is this a diversion from what truly counts?
Each of these questions could constitute avenues for future research. Some of
these questions can be better assessed with qualitative research tools. From this research
alone, based on quantitative analysis, we cannot derive many conclusions—aside from
the urgent need for mixed-method analyses to consider all states that have adopted some
kind of PBF policy. The number of studies in this area is limited and, when done on a
large scale, they do not consider multiple analyzing techniques.
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CHAPTER 5
Discussion, Implications, and Conclusions
This dissertation compiled three essays on the topic of performance management
systems in public administration. In the two empirical essays, which focused on the
adoption and stringency of performance management systems (Chapter 3) and the impact
of PMS (Chapter 4), I used the context of higher education to investigate the research
questions. The primary link between the three essays was the search for answers—to help
us understand the dynamics of PMS. Specifically, in Chapter 2, I conducted a systematic
review of the literature to find gaps, themes, goals, and overall limitations of existing
research. In Chapter 3, I explored the factors that led to the adoption of a PMS, as well as
factors that affected the stringency of the system. Then, in Chapter 4, I focused on the
specific case of higher education by exploring the type of impact that occurs after the
introduction of a PMS.
The systematic literature review sets the foundation for the two empirical studies
in this dissertation. This study uncovered a significant gap in the literature relating to
factors affecting adoption (and stringency) and the impact of the PMS. The latter is
primarily due to the mixed evidence that is heavily skewed toward non-positive results.
Chapter 3 examined this issue from the perspective of the advocates to engage in some
accountability mechanism such as PMS. Chapter 4 investigated the other side of the
equation—aiming to confirm or refute the mixed findings reported in the literature.
The central goal of this dissertation was to contribute to the literature on
performance management systems. Each chapter provides conclusions and a recap of the
research questions. The first section of this conclusion will provide a set of limitations of
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this study. Then, I provide a comprehensive summary of the research questions, which is
followed by my findings. Because detailed conclusions have already been presented in
previous chapters, in this final chapter, I reflect on the major findings of each chapter and
discuss how they address the central goal. In addition, I discuss how this dissertation
contributes to the literature and the practical implications of these contributions.
Key Findings
This dissertation examined three interrelated research questions. The first question
investigated why some states implement PBF while others do not. The second question
investigated why some states adopt more stringent PBF models than others. There has
been a lack of research on the impact of PMS. The third research question investigated
whether the advertised goals of PMS have been realized in practice.
Utilizing the theoretical frameworks of New Public Management, diffusion
(Walker, 1969), and political ideology, I hypothesized that political ideology,
underperformance, and geographical diffusion are positively related to the adoption of a
performance management system. This model was tested using a logit estimation. As
found in the literature, I found evidence that Republicans in office (both Governor and
state legislature) are associated with the adoption of a PMS. Moreover, performance was
found to be negatively associated with adoption. However, the geographical diffusion
hypothesis was not supported.
Utilizing the principal-agent framework, I analyzed the factors that affect
stringency. The stringency model was tested using an OLS regression. In this model, the
only variable that is significant is the proportion of Republicans in the state legislature.
An interesting finding in this model is the effect of time. I find that stringency reaches a
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certain level of plateau, after which it begins to decrease. The model reveals a level of
stagnation that could be attributed to issue-fatigue from the principals, or because the
associated benefit of the PMS decreases as times passes. This is a novel finding and a
contribution to the literature, and it serves as an avenue for future research.
These findings provide evidence that adoption and stringency are not affected by
the same factors. While states might act by adopting a PMS, the same factors do not
affect the system’s configuration.
To explore the impact of the performance management system, three hypotheses
were formulated: PMS produces positive outcomes, PMS produces negative outcomes,
and PMS produces null outcomes. This model was tested using the DID approach and an
OLS regression. The research provides evidence that PMS adoption produces no specific
results. This finding expands our knowledge on the impact of these policies. It raises
concerns regarding the ongoing debate about accountability mechanisms that are possibly
used primarily for symbolic purposes.
The findings from both empirical studies allow us to draw a unified conclusion.
Many factors contribute to PMS adoption. In this dissertation, I identify political ideology
and performance. Once the PMS is installed, there is an initial, rapid tightening of the
system. Next, a tipping point is reached and, at this point, stringency begins to decrease.
A plausible cause might be that PMS was adopted to convince constituencies that
politicians were acting to solve a problem (i.e., for symbolic purposes). The impact
analysis supports this view, because the impact of the PMS is null.
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Measurement and Goal Setting
In Chapter 2, I found measurement, goal setting, and use of performance
information to be critical aspects of a performance management system. A PMS is a
multi-dimensional, complex policy mechanism that requires sophisticated mechanisms to
function well. The absence of one of these aspects does not negate the PMS. However,
the poor design in either one of these aspects will hinder its ability to succeed.
Measurement-related factors, in particular, contributed to PMS failure to deliver
promises. Measurement is a problem for two reasons: inability to capture intangible
outcomes, and inability to fully capture outcomes that are quantifiable.
The literature highlighted two critical factors of a performance system that relate
to system configuration: measurement and goal setting. A primary contribution of
Chapter 3 is the development of the Performance Funding Uncertainty Index (PFUI).
This index aims to capture system configurations to standardize how systems are
compared. Because no method had existed to perform such comparisons, I developed the
PFUI. The PFUI provides a novel way to assess the level of stringency for PMS in higher
education. However, we are still unable to utilize it as a mechanism to assess PMS
configurations across sectors (e.g., higher education vs. federal government, etc.). This is
an area where we might benefit from future research to holistically assess the stringency
level of performance management systems.
PMS is a multidimensional, sophisticated policy tool. However, the presence of a
PMS alone is not a decisive factor to effect changes in performance. Equally important to
consider is how the system is configured. System configuration directly impacts how
organizations subject to the performance system will respond. This is a significant
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finding, because, previously, little attention has been directed toward the specifications of
the system. Most of the focus has been on adoption and/or implementation.
Lack of incentives (which are linked to the system configuration) are also found
to be a common “scapegoat” to explain why the system fails to deliver. These two are
connected to the themes we find in Chapter 3 related to the system stringency.
Time
Time is a recurring theme. It was cited in the literature as a cause for the system’s
inability to be effective. The findings in Chapter 3, however, present the time concept
from another perspective: to a certain extent, time debilitates the PMS. Time is also a
factor in the longitudinal analysis presented in Chapter 4.
Therefore, we should consider time as a common theme in the analysis of this
policy tool. First, time should be considered from the perspective of agents. This refers to
the amount of time needed for performance to respond to the interventions that emerge
from PMS adoption. Second, analysis should be conducted from the perspective of
principals. In this case, we see the stringency level of the PMS follows an increasing
trajectory. A tipping point is eventually reached, which signals that the initial enthusiasm
for PMS has begun to diminish. The increasing trajectory in stringency results in systems
that are soft for the initial-stage of adopters; stringency increases as the principals learn
through it. The middle-stage adopters face a system that might be reaching its highest
level of stringency, and late-stage adopters face a system that is stagnant.
Finally, the third lens through which we can view time is analytical. The time in
which adoption occurs matters, not only from the level of stringency perspective, but also
from the point of view of evaluating the systems’ effectiveness. If institutions adopt the
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same PMS configuration in one state at different points in time, the results might differ.
There may be other factors at play (e.g., organizational characteristics might change;
implementation strategies might be different).
From the perspective of the agent, how much time is needed before the
effectiveness of a PMS can be assessed? From the time the PMS is adopted, to the
moment when it is implemented at the organizational level, there are many steps in
between. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect that a PMS will produce yearly impacts
beginning with the first year it was adopted. This is an area of future research that can
provide best practices to practitioners, policymakers, and agents. It will also provide
realistic expectations.
PMS can be viewed as decoration; PMS has been utilized as a symbolic
mechanism by policymakers—who must demonstrate action to bolster their re-election
hopes—and proponents of PMS—who may view the PMS as a way to validate their
decision-making. Having a PMS also gives the impression that something is being done
to guarantee results. It will be key to identify the point at which the enthusiasm is lost.
Are we willing to engage in the trade-off between PMS and values?
The evidence from Chapter 4 indicates that PMS adoption does not produce
enhanced outcomes. Concerns have been raised that through PMS adoption, public
organizations sacrifice their fundamental democratic values. The field should reach
consensus on how to achieve the unfulfilled promise of PMS—to enhance performance.
The reality is that performance management systems are here to stay. Dr. Mark B.
Rosenberg, President of Florida International University—an R1 institution and the
fourth largest university in terms of enrollment in the United States, described his views
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of PMS as: “we have to make it work, it has to be a win-win.” We each have a
responsibility to come to the right balance in terms of accounting for intangible outcomes
that are not being measured by the PBF. In addition, agents and policymakers must
remain true to the mission of their institutions and to the democratic values of their
organizations.
Perhaps the benefits associated to PMS are not the enhanced performance effects
that one might expect but rather the associated benefits from giving the impression to the
constituencies that there are controls in place to keep entities accountable, and these are
being verified. In addition to enhancement of performance, changes to the organizational
culture, awareness of performance, and a desire to produce results are other benefits
associated with a PMS that should not be ignored.
This research contributes to the body of literature in multiple ways. First, it
challenges the current knowledge which equates the factors explaining adoption and
stringency of performance systems. I argue that these are two separate processes are only
loosely connected. Second, I provide a new theoretical explanation for how adopted
performance systems evolve over time. Third, I develop a new measure to assess the
stringency of performance systems in higher education. Lastly, this dissertation examined
the impact of PMS in a specific policy area—higher education—across the nation.
Implications for Public Policy Making and Management
As researchers, one of the main goals of embarking in a research venture is to be
able to provide meaningful policy advice. The empirical evidence reported in this study
shows that performance management systems fail to fulfill their objective (see Chapter
4). The results suggest that PMS do not produce significant results on their own. In this

131

sense, policy makers should exercise caution in adoption and implementation of such a
costly policy tool such as PBF given its inability to enhance the key performance
indicators of public universities mandated by state legislatures.
One could argue that enhancing performance of state universities has not been the
real intent behind the adoption of PBF. Rather the goal was more symbolic, seeking to
give an impression for change but instead aiming at keeping the status quo. There is no
doubt that the decision to adopt PBF for public universities came as a response to the
pressures to address the underperformance of state education systems. In this sense, the
PBF adoption does serve symbolic purposes—to show constituencies and the general
public that system underperformance is a major concern and it has been acted upon. Yet,
whether the PBF adoption was mainly a symbolic action or it coincided with legislators’
sincere preferences is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Future research could delve
into the motivation of individual legislators to provide a better understanding of the
politics surrounding the adoption of performance systems, especially those already
known for not producing intangible results.
One of the assumptions of this dissertation, underlying the analysis of the PBF
systems’ stringency, is that agents (i.e., universities) seek to game the system in order to
enhance the performance indicators (see chapter 3 under the stringency section).
Anecdotal evidence suggest that universities employ various tactics to score better on
KPIs. However, this dissertation detects no real improvement in the universities’
performance such as graduation rates, which in turns indicates that either there is no
significant gaming taking place or, if there are some efforts in this direction, they have
not produced much discernible changes.
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From my position of an administrator in a public university, I can attest to the fact
that the presence of a performance management system has changed the way we make
decisions. In this sense, there might be intangible changes that are not easily quantifiable.
For example, in the past, we only focused on the inputs (e.g., number of students
enrolled, total number of fundable student credit hours) and paid little attention to student
success. The reality is now different. Funding from a performance-based system is the
only source of incremental funding we can aspire to have. The eligibility to receive this
funding is determined on how well we perform in a set of indicators. In addition, our
funding is also jeopardized for underperforming, i.e. our funding is taken away if we fall
behind the goal. We, therefore, do not have any other option but to pay attention to
student success. Future research should dig deeper into the behavior of individual
administrators to better understand the type of changes that are actually taking place, as
the changes in institutions’ behavior, suggested by the principal-agent theory, do not
appear to be supported by the evidence presented in this dissertation.
Further, the introduction of PBF has coincided with aggressive prestige-seeking
by public universities. Achieving better rankings, like performance-based funding,
requires the attainment of certain performance targets related to student success. In fact,
such prestige-seeking activities were in place well before the adoption of a performancebased funding system. It is possible then that these prestige-related efforts have started
producing results in terms of student outcomes, thus, wiping out the impact of the
adoption of performance-based funding mechanism on the institution’s performance. It is
a challenge to differentiate between such effects and understand what is truly happening
through quantitative tools. Future research could benefit from pursuing a case study that
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will allow to understand the context and the underlying motivation of administrators for
pursuing performance improvement: to qualify for funding from the PBF or to enhance
the university’s ranking.
Limitations
I will briefly summarize limitations that have previously been cited in the
literature, as well as limitations to my own analyses. The systematic literature review,
Chapter 2, identified limitations related to the data, including limited population and
small samples, measurement of performance, as well as missing important variables.
Other limitations are related to statistical techniques, such as reverse causality, and
history threats, that is, other events influencing performance at the time of PBF adoption.
The analysis of factors affecting PBF adoption and stringency faced some
additional limitations. For example, organizational factors (e.g., characteristics of the
bureaucracy) may affect performance. From chapter 3, an important limitation to
consider is how diffusion was measured. It seems that regional proximity did not
determine whether states would attempt to follow policy trends.
The most important limitation in Chapter 4, which analyzes the impact of a PMS,
is related to our inability to determine whether other factors are at play. This is true,
however, for any analysis of policy impact. To address this potential flaw, the models
control for various alternative explanations, including for fixed effects by year and state.
However, this limitation is noteworthy because it was cited in the literature review.
For all analyses presented in this dissertation, the sample population was limited
to states with R1 institutions. This might affect our ability to generalize findings to other
states and institutions that may not emphasize research as central to their missions.
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Future Research
In this section, I aimed to develop a future research agenda based on the findings
of the present dissertation. I encourage researchers to undertake research efforts that
would address the concerns surrounding measurement. Measurement, as I have
discussed, is an important aspect of PMS. Measurement affects the system’s ability to
function. The focus in measurement should be on utilizing the most appropriate
indicators to capture the organization’s performance. Studies in measurement will also
benefit policy makers and governing boards who devise PMS.
In addition, analyzing the effect of time is important. I propose three different
perspectives from which future research should study time in PMS. First, time should be
evaluated from the perspective that different entry times might affect the level of
stringency decided by agents. Which entry point is ideal? Second, time should be studied
from the perspective of understanding which factors contribute to the system’s
stagnation. Lastly, time should be evaluated to understand when it is reasonable to study
the impact of a PMS (i.e., after PMS adoption, how much time is needed before a fair
evaluation can occur?).
One of the aspects briefly discussed in this dissertation is the high cost associated
with the implementation of PMS. I recommend that researchers conduct a thorough study
to explore how much PMS costs at each institution and, at the aggregate level, per state.
This will allow a true assessment of benefit-cost analysis and provide additional
information regarding the trade-offs associated with PMS adoption. In general, the
information about cost-effectiveness of PMS implementation is limited (Frank &
D’Souza, 2004). For this reason, a cost-benefit study would be significant. A mixed-
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methods approach would be helpful in order to consider context and intangible aspects of
a PMS, which may be neglected if only quantitative approaches are used. Specifically, a
case study of a particular institution, or set of institutions, would be useful. In addition,
conducting interviews with key stakeholders would provide more information about the
context and circumstances surrounding the adoption and implementation of PMS, which
would allow for a fair assessment of the benefits and costs associated with a PMS.
This dissertation has discussed the landscape of performance-based funding in
higher education. However, the discussion did not include net tuition revenue. It would
be irresponsible for me to not mention the serious stress universities are facing due to the
consistently decreased growth in tuition revenue. In the case of public institutions, tuition
revenue alone does not fully cover the cost of education. Tuition revenue is a critical
financial barometer as it is the backbone of most college and university budgets (Seltzer,
2019). Declining tuition revenue has resulted in an increased reliance on state
appropriations and performance funding. For this reason, researchers should examine the
relationship between PMS adoption and tuition revenue. This would require gathering
information from each university. This dissertation uses the state as the unit of measure
for the adoption analysis.
Not relevant to this dissertation, but pertinent and timely to higher education, is
the topic of student loans. In the United States, total student debt at the end of 2017 was
$1.31 trillion. The total student debt increases by approximately $4,000 per second. A
2016 college graduate for 2016 had an average student debt of $37,172 (Fay, n.d.). These
are concerning statistics, yet they are not captured by any of the PMS dimensions. Future
research should investigate the impact of PMS on student debt levels. Such an
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investigation would reconcile two salient issues: the alarming levels of student debts
versus the need to hold institutions of higher education accountable.
This dissertation does not consider the role of organizations which play an
important role in the shaping of policies at the state level (such as the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and other local and national think tanks). A future
study may benefit from accounting for how these players affect adoption, in order to map
out all possible factors at play when the decision to adopt is made. Lastly, another
important factor to consider in the future is the role of rankings. Trends towards prestige
pursuing actions have significantly affected the landscape of higher education and, like
performance-based funding, some of the ranking criteria requires the achievement of
certain levels of performance on student performance indicators. While this study
considers the U. S. News Ranking as an independent variable as a proxy of university
performance, a study that uses a proxy for ranking as a dependent variable in order to see
how it affects adoption of a performance-based funding will be useful.
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APPENDICES
TABLE A1. Other Measures, Chapter 3
Measure (source)

Description

Number of years PBF Present
(NCLS Database)

Measures the number of years the PBF is present
for each state

Average U.S. News Ranking (U.S.
News Survey)

U.S. News surveys top academics – presidents,
provosts and deans of admissions – asking them to
rate the academic quality of peer institutions with
which they are familiar on a scale of 1 (marginal)
to 5 (distinguished). Academic reputation matters
because it factors things that cannot easily be
captured elsewhere. For example, an institution
known for having innovative approaches to
teaching may perform especially well on this
indicator, whereas a school struggling to keep its
accreditation will likely perform poorly.

Governor’s party affiliation
(Election Yearbook for the United
States)

Binary variable coded as 1 if the governor’s party
is Republican and 2 if it is Democrat.

Percent of republicans in state
legislature (Election Yearbook for
the United States)

Total number of Republican legislators divided by
the total numbers of seats in the legislature.

Diffusion (Election Yearbook for
the United States)

Ratio of Neighboring States with PBF over Total
number of Neighboring States
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Appendix A2. Regression Diagnostics
Linearity

154

Normality
Kernel Density Estimate

Normal Probability Plot

Normal Quantile Plot

Homoscedasticity

155

Outlier

156

Multicollinearity
Adoption Model

Stringency Model
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TABLE A1: Other Measures, Chapter 4
Measure (source)

Description

Racial Diversity

Percent of undergraduates who are White.

Enrollment Intensity of Students

Percent of part-time students.

Average U.S. News Ranking (U.S.
News Survey)

U.S. News surveys top academics – presidents,
provosts and deans of admissions – asking them
to rate the academic quality of peer institutions
with which they are familiar on a scale of 1
(marginal) to 5 (distinguished). Academic
reputation matters because it factors things that
cannot easily be captured elsewhere. For
example, an institution known for having
innovative approaches to teaching may perform
especially well on this indicator, whereas a
school struggling to keep its accreditation will
likely perform poorly.
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